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REGULATING DERIVATIVES:
A FUNDAMENTAL RETHINKING
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ABSTRACT
The conventional wisdom is that derivatives are exotic and uniquely
risky, although innovative, financial instruments. That perception has
given rise to a regulatory patchwork described as “confusing,
incomplete, [and] contradictory.”1 This Article rethinks how
derivatives should be regulated. It begins by demystifying derivatives.
In contrast to the arcane industry-derived categories, the Article
deconstructs derivatives more intuitively, by their economic functions,
into two categories of traditional legal instruments—option contracts
and guarantees. Being neither exotic nor uniquely risky, most
derivatives should be regulated like those traditional instruments. The
Article then explains why at least one subset of guarantees—financial
guarantees with systemically important counterparties, which are
epitomized by credit-default swap derivatives—can seriously threaten
economic stability and why the absence of an insurable-interest
requirement can further magnify that threat. Finally, the Article
examines how to design regulation that efficiently targets that threat.
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INTRODUCTION
The standard definition of a derivative is a financial contract about
an underlying asset or assets from which the contract derives its value.2
This definition, which is followed by the International Swaps and

2. Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2011).
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Derivatives Association (“ISDA”),3 the leading industry trade
organization,4 suggests that derivatives are exotic and complex, though
possibly innovative, financial instruments.5 An early history of highly
publicized losses by large and sophisticated investors also suggests that
derivatives are inherently riskier than other financial instruments.6
Reinforced by politicians and the media, these perceptions are widely
shared, even by scholars.7
Especially since the 2007–2008 financial crisis (“financial crisis”),
many observers believe that derivatives are also systemically risky,8
threatening economic stability by undermining the ability of the

3. See Glossary, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, https://www.isda.org/1970/01/01/
glossary [https://perma.cc/YH6N-X4F9] (defining a derivative as a “financial instrument that . . .
derives its value from the price or rate of some other underlying assets such as bonds, loans,
equities, currencies, commodities, indices, published rates or combinations of those assets”).
4. See About ISDA, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, https://www.isda.org/about-isda
[https://perma.cc/3TKD-XF3F]. See generally Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Engineered Credit Default
Swaps: Innovative or Manipulative?, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073 (2019) (discussing ISDA).
5. See, e.g., Dan Awrey, Split Derivatives: Inside The World’s Most Misunderstood
Contract, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 503–04 (2019) [hereinafter Awrey, Split Derivatives]
(discussing derivatives’ complexity); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of
Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 245–58 (2012) (same); Timothy E. Lynch,
Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 9 (2011) (referring to
a common understanding of derivatives as “complex” and “exotic”); Steven McNamara, Financial
Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC
Derivatives, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 218 (2014) (comparing derivatives
with securities transactions).
6. In April 1994, Procter & Gamble Co. announced a $157 million trading loss speculating
on interest rates through derivatives. Gabriella Stern & Steven Lipin, Procter & Gamble to Take
a Charge To Close Out Two Interest-Rate Swaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at A3. Several
months later, Orange County, California, filed for bankruptcy protection due to a $2.5 billion loss
speculating on exotic financial instruments that included derivatives. Laura Jereski, Orange
County Fund Losses Put at $2.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1994, at A3. These investors’
sophistication did not extend to derivatives.
7. See Lynch, supra note 5, at 9 (“[R]egulatory, policy, and even legal discussions of
derivatives are often muddled and demonstrate persistent misunderstandings of what derivatives
are.”); Stout, supra note 2, at 22–31 (arguing that the enactment in 2000 of the Commodities
Futures Modernization Act set the stage for the 2007–2008 financial crisis by legalizing speculative
nonexchange trading in derivatives, thereby dramatically increasing systemic risk); see also supra
note 5.
8. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, DODD-FRANK’S TITLE VII – OTC DERIVATIVES REFORM
1 (2013), https://www.eyjapan.jp/library/issue/us/gaap-weekly-update/pdf/GAAP-2012-10-25-0201.pdf [https://perma.cc/792T-24GB] (“Congress viewed the lack of regulation of OTC derivatives
transactions as exacerbating the 2008 financial crisis . . . .”). OTC derivatives generally refer to
over-the-counter, or privately negotiated, derivatives transactions. Id. at Introduction; see also
infra text accompanying note 244.
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financial system to function as a network.9 The media portrayed
American International Group (“AIG”)—which was potentially liable
under multiple derivatives contracts to investors in mortgage-backed
securities (“MBS”)10—as a poster child for that crisis.11 And even
before the financial crisis, Warren Buffet famously referred to
derivatives contracts as “financial weapons of mass destruction.”12
Derivatives regulation is largely premised on these perceptions,
spawning laws that regulate most derivatives alike as if they are
inherently riskier than other financial instruments (hereinafter,
“uniquely risky”).13 That blunderbuss strategy can backfire, however.14
For example, although U.S. and foreign regulation requires most
derivatives contracts to be cleared and settled through central

9. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204, 207–08 (2008) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (defining systemic risk as risk that threatens the ability of the financial
system to function as a network, thereby jeopardizing the real economy). References in this
Article to “economic stability” and “financial stability” are intended to be synonymous, meaning
the stability of the real economy.
10. See Christoph Henkel, Harmonizing European Union Bank Resolution: Central
Clearing of OTC Derivative Contracts Maintaining the Status Quo of Safe Harbors, 22
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 97 (2013) (explaining that AIG was “unable to post
sufficient collateral to ensure meeting its [margin] obligations under the majority of its CDS
agreements,” leading to “a run on its collateral by its derivative counterparties and CDS
protection buyers”); Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
319, 320 (2010) (describing the AIG collapse as a “downward spiral”). MBS are promissory notes
backed by interests in mortgage loans and thus not themselves derivatives. See FIRST EMPIRE
SEC., MORTGAGE BACKED S ECURITIES, http://www.1empire.com/Forms/MBS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/63SV-M8FR].
11. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr & Joe Valenti, Commentary: How the CFPB Fight Is a Sign of
the Next Financial Crisis, FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2017, 4:16 PM), https://fortune.com/2017/12/06/cfpbdirector-mick-mulvaney-leandra-english [https://perma.cc/MD42-H59F].
12. Letter from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the
Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 21, 2003), in BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002
ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003), https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A5WK-D5FL]. The media has also suggested that Lehman Brothers’ derivatives
contracts were unusually systemically risky. See, e.g., Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman’s Chaotic
Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in Value, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB123050916770038267 [https://perma.cc/9S6X-P2GB] (reporting that the
early termination of Lehman Brothers’ derivatives contracts is estimated to have cost the firm
approximately $50 billion).
13. See Stout, supra note 2, at 33 (“[T]he Congress that enacted Dodd-Frank clearly
recognized that the OTC derivatives market had played a critical, if poorly understood, role in
causing the [financial] crisis.”).
14. See Lynch, supra note 5, at 11–12 (arguing that the standard definition of a derivative is
“both over- and under-inclusive,” thereby “hamper[ing] our ability to differentiate between
socially useful and socially harmful derivatives” and “prolong[ing] the use of an outdated
derivatives regulatory scheme”).
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counterparties,15 it is uncertain whether that requirement actually
reduces, or inadvertently concentrates and increases, systemic risk.16
Furthermore, derivatives regulation does not always adequately
address credit-default swap (“CDS”) derivatives, which this Article
shows to be the most systemically risky type of derivatives.17
This Article deconstructs derivatives into two categories of
traditional legal instruments18—option contracts and guarantees—
which correspond to the derivatives’ economic functions.19 Being
neither exotic nor uniquely risky, most derivatives should be minimally
regulated like those traditional instruments.20 However, at least one
subset of guarantees—namely, guarantees of financial obligations
(“financial guarantees”) with large and highly interconnected financial
institutions as counterparties (“systemically important counterparties”21)—can seriously threaten economic stability. CDS derivatives
epitomize this subset. As a result, derivatives regulation should target
the threat these specific derivatives pose.

15. See infra notes 127–33 and accompanying text. Such clearing and settling is called central
clearing; it usually occurs through a well-capitalized entity associated with a derivatives,
commodities, or other securities exchange. Andrew Bloomenthal, Central Counterparty Clearing
House (CCP), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ccph.asp
[https://perma.cc/MA3W-G7UY].
16. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Parts IV.B & IV.C (discussing credit-default swaps as the most systemically
risky type of derivative).
18. This Article uses the term “instrument” in accordance with standard legal usage to mean
any “legal document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities.” Instrument, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
19. See Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the
Financial Environment, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3–4
(Dwight B. Crane et al. eds., 1995) (viewing finance from a “functional perspective” by focusing
on the underlying economic functions); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A
Functional Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2016) (“In thinking about regulating a
dynamically changing financial system, it may be more effective . . . to focus on the system’s
underlying, and thus less time-dependent, economic functions than to tie regulation to any specific
financial architecture.”).
20. For example, neither loan agreements, option contracts, nor guarantees are generally
regulated. The author is aware of only two types of restrictions on sophisticated parties entering
into traditional legal instruments: restrictions on charging usurious rates of interest, see, e.g., Ann
K. Wooster, Construction and Application of Usury Provisions in State Constitutions, 73 A.L.R.
6TH 571, 571 (2012) (listing and discussing usury laws in different states), and restrictions on
margin lending as set forth in Federal Reserve Regulations G, 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.1–207.11 (2020);
T, §§ 220.1–220.132; U, §§ 221.1–221.125; and X, §§ 224.1–224.3.
21. This definition of systemically important counterparties should at least be deemed to
encompass firms that are designated by the federal government as systemically important
financial institutions (“SIFIs”). See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I deconstructs derivatives
into option contracts and guarantees. It also demonstrates that most
derivatives are not inherently riskier than those traditional legal
instruments. Part II analyzes what can make a derivative risky. It shows
that, as financial guarantees, CDS contracts can threaten economic
stability when they have one or more systemically important
counterparties and that the absence of an insurable-interest
requirement22 can further magnify that threat. Part III critiques
existing derivatives regulation, arguing that such regulation often starts
from the flawed premise that most derivatives are uniquely risky.
Additionally, it shows that derivatives regulation that starts from that
flawed premise—including aspects of the Group of Twenty (“G20”)
nations’ regulatory scheme for derivatives,23 which is followed by the
United States24—is also flawed. Part IV argues that derivatives
regulation should target CDS contracts that can threaten economic
stability. It also analyzes how to design that regulation. The Appendix
proposes model language for its implementation.
The Article’s analysis focuses on derivatives counterparties that
are sophisticated and understand their contracts. The extent to which
regulators should impose “suitability” or similar requirements on less
sophisticated or knowledgeable derivatives counterparties is beyond
this Article’s scope.25

22. This is a requirement that a person taking out insurance must derive some benefit from
the continued existence of the insured person or property. See infra note 118 and accompanying
text.
23. The G20 is “a collection of twenty of the world’s largest economies [including the United
States] formed in 1999” to “bring together the most important industrialized and developing
economies to discuss international economic and financial stability.” James McBride & Andrew
Chatzky, The Group of Twenty, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (June 10, 2019), https://
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/group-twenty [https://perma.cc/3XSQ-ND2D].
24. See Richard Heckinger, Ivana Ruffini & Kirstin Wells, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., Overthe-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, in UNDERSTANDING DERIVATIVES: MARKETS AND
INFRASTRUCTURE ch. 3, at 32 (2014), https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/
understanding-derivatives/understanding-derivatives-chapter-3-over-the-counter-derivatives-pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MT7F-M92M]; Over-The-Counter Derivatives, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/financial-services-and-infrastructure/financial-market-infrastructureand-reform/over-the-counter-derivatives [https://perma.cc/P86F-JJQ8] (observing that the
United States is implementing the G20-proposed reforms “under the Dodd-Frank [Act] and
rulemakings by U.S. agencies, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Securities
and Exchange Commission, as well as prudential regulators including the Federal Reserve”).
25. For discussions of the suitability doctrine and its development under securities laws, see
Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine Is Not Suitable for
OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 527, 529 (1998); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R.
Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1558 (1999); Robert H.
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I. DECONSTRUCTING DERIVATIVES
A proper understanding of derivatives will drive better derivatives
regulation. Cutting through their mystique, derivatives are simply riskshifting contracts between two or more parties.26 That does not make
them unique; indeed, the purpose of many financial contracts is to shift
risks.27 Nor does the fact that derivatives derive their value from
underlying assets28 make them unique; “[i]n reality, the value of every
asset depends in part on something else.”29 Moreover, derivatives may
not even be innovative—the “Babylonians used [contracts similar to]
derivative contracts to bet on the fates of desert trading caravans.”30
Section A deconstructs derivatives by their economic functions
into two categories of traditional legal instruments: option contracts
and guarantees. Thereafter, Section B demonstrates that derivatives
contracts are not inherently riskier than those traditional instruments.
A. Functionally, Derivatives Are Option Contracts and Guarantees
Market participants generally refer to four types of derivatives
contracts: options, forwards, futures, and swaps.31 An option is a
contract under which one party has the right to buy an asset from, or
sell an asset to, another party on or before a future date at a specified

Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J.
445, 448.
26. Derivative Financial Markets (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. &
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 103d Cong. 160 (1994) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“The economic function of
[derivatives] is to allow risks that formerly had been combined to be unbundled and transferred
to those most willing to assume and manage each risk component.”); Saul S. Cohen, The
Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993, 2005 & n.61 (1995) (“[O]ne should
understand that derivatives lessen volatility by efficiently shifting risk from parties less able or
willing to bear it to others with the resources to more readily absorb such risk in exchange for a
potential profit.”).
27. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Prioritization and Mutualization: Clearinghouses and the
Redundancy of the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 129, 141 (2015)
(discussing why many financial contracts shift credit and market risk); Edward J. Janger & John
A.E. Pottow, Implementing Symmetric Treatment of Financial Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank
Resolution, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 155, 155 (2015) (discussing the various functions
of financial contracts).
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
29. Lynch, supra note 5, at 28.
30. Stout, supra note 2, at 11 (citing LAURENT L. JACQUE, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES
DEBACLES: FROM THEORY TO MALPRACTICE 4 (2010)).
31. See Lynch, supra note 5, at 20 (observing that, in “common parlance, derivatives are
typically referred to as options, forwards, or swaps (or hybrids of each)” (citations omitted)).
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price.32 Next, a forward contract is “an agreement between two parties
(a buyer and a seller) that calls for the delivery of an asset at a future
point in time [at] a price agreed upon today.”33 Similarly, a futures
contract is a standardized “type of forward contract that is traded on
an organized exchange and subject to exchange rules and clearing
procedures.”34 Finally, a swap is a contract under which “two parties
agree to exchange (or ‘swap’) at least two identified sets of cash flows”
on a future date.35
Although these industry-derived categories describe some of the
mechanics of derivatives contracts, they do not provide an analytical
foundation for regulating derivatives. To provide that foundation, this
Article shows that all derivatives can be deconstructed by their
economic functions into traditional option contracts and guarantees.
1. Deconstructing Derivatives into Option Contracts. One type of
derivative, an option, maps directly onto the traditional category of
legal instruments known as option contracts.36 Option contracts are
contracts that “limit[] the promisor’s power to revoke an offer.”37 They
are therefore coextensive with option derivatives. For example, an
option derivative under which one party has the right to buy an asset
from another party on a future date, at a set price,38 is an option
contract because the seller of that asset cannot revoke its promise to
sell on those terms.39 Similarly, an option derivative under which one
party has the right to sell an asset to another party on a future date, at
a set price, is an option contract because the buyer of that asset cannot
revoke its promise to buy on those terms.40
2. Deconstructing Derivatives into Guarantees. The International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the finance literature refer to the three

32. DON M. CHANCE & ROBERT BROOKS, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 28 (9th ed. 2013).
33. Id. at 258.
34. Lynch, supra note 5, at 20 n.75; see also CHANCE & BROOKS, supra note 32, at 258.
35. Lynch, supra note 5, at 20 n.76. Swaps also could be viewed, economically, as a series of
forward contracts. CHANCE & BROOKS, supra note 32, at 413.
36. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 10 (4th ed. 1998)
(describing option contracts as a traditional contract category).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (defining an option
contract).
38. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (defining an option derivative).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
40. See id.
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remaining types of derivatives—forward contracts, futures contracts,
and swaps41—as “forward-type contracts.”42 Forward-type contracts
represent arrangements in which the parties agree to exchange—that
is, to swap—identified assets (or their market value43) or cash flows at
a future time. Thus, in a forward contract, the parties agree to deliver
an asset at a future time in exchange for an agreed price;44 in a futures
contract, the parties agree on standardized terms to deliver an asset at
a future time in exchange for an agreed price;45 and in a swap, the
parties agree to exchange identified cash flows at a future time.46
Although the term “forward-type contract” streamlines
derivatives-industry terminology, it does not describe a category of
traditional legal instruments. Functionally, however, all forward-type
contracts fit into the traditional category of “guarantees,” which are
promises or assurances that certain conditions will be fulfilled.47 To
understand why, consider the most widely used forward-type contracts:

41.
42.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
INT’L MONETARY FUND, MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS MANUAL AND
COMPILATION GUIDE para. 4.160 (2017) [hereinafter IMF MANUAL], https://www.imf.org/~/
media/Files/Data/Guides/mfsmcg_merged-web-pdf [https://perma.cc/7WXU-LJT9] (“There are
two broad types of financial derivatives—options and forward-type contracts.”); id. para. at 4.162
(“A forward-type contract . . . is an unconditional contract by which two counterparties agree to
exchange a specified quantity of an underlying item (financial or real) at an agreed-upon contract
price (the strike price) on a specified date.”). Although the IMF Manual uses the term “financial
derivatives,” there does not appear to be any material difference between that term and this
Article’s term “derivatives.” Cf. E-mail from Colleen M. Baker, Assistant Professor of Legal
Stud., Price Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Oklahoma, to author (Dec. 23, 2019) (on file with author)
(“Finance literature breaks derivatives into options and forwards.”).
43. See infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (observing that futures contracts are simply
standardized types of forwards).
46. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47. See Guarantee, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/guarantee [https://perma.cc/
QP7N-W6WN] (defining a “guarantee” as a “formal promise or assurance (typically in writing)
that certain conditions will be fulfilled”). This Article uses the spelling “guarantee” rather than
the much less common “guaranty” spelling. Whereas the latter spelling sometimes refers only to
a financial guaranty, the former spelling includes, in the author’s experience, all guarantees. But
cf. E-mail from Pim (W.A.K.) Rank, Professor of Fin. L., Leiden Univ. Faculty of L., to author
(Feb. 10, 2020) (on file with author) (clarifying that whereas this Article uses the word guarantee
“to refer both to the situation where a party simply commits itself to fulfill a particular obligation
and to the situation where a party undertakes to answer for the performance of another person’s
debt or obligation in the event of a default by the person primarily responsible,” of which a CDS
is “a typical example,” lawyers in “the Netherlands and many other continental European
jurisdiction[s] . . . would not use the word guarantee to refer to the first situation”).
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commodity swaps, interest-rate swaps, and CDS contracts.48 In a typical
commodity swap, Parties A and B effectively bet on the market value
of an identified unit of commodity Y at time1 (“t1”) in the future. If
the market value of that unit at t1 exceeds $X, say by $Δ, the contract
requires Party A to pay $Δ to Party B. If the market value of that unit
at t1 is below $X, say by $Φ, the contract requires Party B to pay $Φ to
Party A.49 The swap functions economically, then, as two guarantees.
Each party to the transaction guarantees the other party that the
market value of a unit of commodity Y will not be above or below $X
at t1, respectively. Unless the value of the unit is $X at t1, one party
pays the other $Δ or $Φ, according to which guarantee was not met.
Although parties historically settled these types of derivatives
contracts by actual delivery of commodities, cash settlements are now
more common because they are convenient.50
Similarly, in a typical interest-rate swap, Parties A and B agree to
exchange a stream of floating interest-rate payments for a stream of
fixed interest-rate payments, based on an identified principal amount,
identified interest rates, and a specified time period.51 The party that
initiates the swap—say Party A—usually is trying to manage the
exposure created by its obligations to pay a floating interest rate on an
underlying loan. Party A accomplishes this in a swap by paying a

48. See, e.g., Carney Simpson, Note, Do End-Users Get the Best of Both Worlds?—Title VII
of Dodd–Frank and the End-User Exception, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1759, 1775 (2012)
(reporting on a 2010 ISDA survey showing that “80% [of derivatives counterparties] use the OTC
market for interest rate swaps, 59% for currency swaps, 27% for credit default swaps, 25% for
equity swaps, and 32% for energy/commodity swaps”). Recall that CDS is the acronym for a
credit-default swap. Justin Kuepper, Credit Default Swap (CDS) Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar.
20, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditdefaultswap.asp [https://perma.cc/ZYK8HFFX].
49. For example, assume Parties A and B make their contract in April 2019, that the
identified unit of commodity Y is one ton of iron ore, that t1 is April 15, 2020, and that $X is $90.
In April 2019, the market value of a ton of iron ore was approximately $93.70. See Iron Ore Prices
from May 2019 to May 2020 (in U.S. Dollars per Dry Metric Ton Unit), STATISTA, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/300419/monthly-iron-ore-prices [https://perma.cc/YQ92-RAJS]. In
mid-April 2020, the market value of a ton of iron ore had fallen to approximately $84.73, see id.,
which is below $90 by $5.27 (that is, $Φ = $5.27). Under the contract, Party B must pay $5.27 to
Party A.
50. See James Chen, Cash Settlement, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 4, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cashsettlement.asp [https://perma.cc/2FL5-WUPZ]; cf. MICHAEL
DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 1 (2d ed. 2010) (observing that although “some derivatives
guarantee something other than a price [like performance of an obligation or even] things like
temperature or rainfall,” the “vast majority of derivatives are price guarantees”).
51. See, e.g., Justin Kuepper, Interest Rate Swap Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/interestrateswap.asp [https://perma.cc/8CF6-L53E].
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stream of fixed interest-rate payments to its counterparty, Party B, and
receiving in exchange the stream of floating interest-rate payments—
which it then uses to pay its lender.52 If the amount of the stream of
fixed interest-rate payments exceeds the amount of the stream of
floating interest-rate payments, say by $Δ, Party A would be required
to pay $Δ to Party B.53 If the amount of the stream of floating interestrate payments exceeds the amount of the stream of fixed interest-rate
payments, say by $Φ, Party B would be required to pay $Φ to Party A.
Party B would agree to the swap if it believes the stream of fixed
interest-rate payments it receives from Party A will exceed the stream
of floating interest-rate payments that it pays to Party A.54
Economically, an interest-rate swap—just like a commodity
swap—functions as two guarantees. Party A guarantees Party B that
the amount of the stream of fixed interest-rate payments exceeds the
amount of the stream of floating interest-rate payments. Party B
guarantees Party A that the amount of the stream of floating interestrate payments exceeds the amount of the stream of fixed interest-rate
payments.55
The last most commonly used forward-type contract, a CDS
contract, is most transparently a guarantee. Indeed, it is a special type
called a “financial guarantee.”56 In a typical CDS contract,57 a
protection or credit “seller” (say Party A) agrees to assume, in
exchange for a fee, a protection or credit “buyer’s” (say Party B’s)
credit risk with respect to certain debt obligations owed by a specified
borrower or other obligor.58 If a “credit event”—for example, default
or bankruptcy—occurs in respect of that obligor, Party A will either
pay Party B an amount calculated by reference to the post-default

52. See Interest Rate Swaps, PIMCO, https://global.pimco.com/en-gbl/resources/education/
understanding-interest-rate-swaps [https://perma.cc/34UJ-3Y66] (explaining interest-rate swaps
generally).
53. The actual settlement times for payment depend on the specific contract.
54. Interest Rate Swaps, supra note 52.
55. If the amount of the stream of fixed interest-rate payments exceeds the amount of the
stream of floating interest-rate payments, say by $Δ, Party A would be required to pay $Δ to Party
B. If the amount of the stream of floating interest-rate payments exceeds the amount of the stream
of fixed interest-rate payments, say by $Φ, Party B would be required to pay $Φ to Party A.
56. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
57. CDS contracts are sometimes referred to as credit derivatives. IMF MANUAL, supra
note 42, at para. 4.180. References in this Article to CDS contracts and credit derivatives are
synonymous.
58. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 10:1.1 (Adam D. Ford ed., 3d ed. 2010).
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value of the debt obligations or buy the debt obligations for their full
face value from Party B.59
Although market participants regard CDS contracts as swaps60
and the “S” in the CDS acronym stands for “swap,” a CDS is not a
typical swap.61 Rather, it epitomizes a financial guarantee—a
contractual arrangement in which one party, in exchange for a fee,
agrees for the benefit of another party to assume credit risk on a debt
obligation.62 In the author’s experience, market participants sometimes
characterize a CDS as “a guarantee documented as a derivative” by
writing the contract on an ISDA form.

59. Id. § 10:3.1. For example, assume Party B makes a loan to Party C, and Party B is
concerned about Party C’s ability to repay the loan. Party B, as protection buyer, may then enter
into a CDS contract with Party A, as protection seller, under which Party A agrees to make any
payments that Party C fails to make. In exchange for this protection, Party B pays Party A a fee.
See, e.g., Credit Default Swaps, PIMCO, https://www.pimco.com/en-us/resources/education/
understanding-credit-default-swaps [https://perma.cc/934H-ZLRZ] (explaining credit-default
swaps). Protection sellers may enter into many CDS contracts, thereby earning fee income while
helping market participants to hedge risk.
60. Congress, for example, included in its definition of a “‘swap agreement’ . . . any such
agreement, contract, or transaction commonly known as an interest rate swap, including a . . . debt
swap, credit spread, credit default swap, [or] credit swap.” Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, tit. III, sec. 301(a), § 206A(a), 114 Stat. 2763A-365,
2763A-449 to -450.
61. Documenting a CDS as a derivatives contract on an ISDA form does not make it a
traditional swap. In a traditional swap, the counterparties exchange cash flows on underlying
financial instruments. The business goal is to trade, or swap, the variable cash-flow risks between
the counterparties. See Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694,
30,695 (July 21, 1989) (“[A] swap may be characterized as an agreement between two parties to
exchange a series of cash flows measured by different interest rates, exchange rates, or prices with
payments calculated by reference to a principal base . . . .”). In a CDS, the guarantee fee is not
variable but a fixed-payment obligation. See Stout, supra note 2, at 6 (describing CDS
transactions). But cf. Darrell Duffie, Credit Swap Valuation, 1999 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 73, 73
(arguing that the “term ‘swap’ applies to credit swaps because they can be viewed, under certain
ideal conditions . . . , as a swap of a default-free floating-rate note for a defaultable floating-rate
note”). For an introduction to ISDA’s form documentation, see generally ISDA, LEGAL
GUIDELINES FOR SMART DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS: THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (Feb.
2019), https://www.isda.org/a/23iME/Legal-Guidelines-for-Smart-Derivatives-Contracts-ISDAMaster-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN4V-CSVL].
62. See Guarantee, supra note 47 (providing a legal definition of “guarantee” as a “formal
pledge to pay another person’s debt or to perform another person’s obligation in the case of
default”). U.K. law, for example, recognizes a CDS’s essential guarantee function. See, e.g.,
Leonard Ng, Credit Default Swaps, Guarantees and Insurance Policies: Same Effect, Different
Treatment?, 25 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 664, 664–66 (2010) (observing that
U.K. financial and insurance law treats CDS contracts and guarantees similarly in many important
respects, in sharp contrast to how that law treats “insurance contracts,” with which they are
sometimes confused).
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By their economic functions, derivatives contracts are thus option
contracts and guarantees.63 This suggests that derivatives contracts,
inherently, are no riskier than those traditional legal instruments.64
Section B demonstrates this proposition.
B. Derivatives Are Not Inherently Riskier than Option
Contracts and Guarantees
The widely held perception that derivatives are inherently riskier
than other financial instruments is based on anecdotal information65
and has never been rigorously tested. This Section examines and
corrects this misperception, showing that derivatives are not inherently
riskier than option contracts and guarantees.66
Some argue that derivatives are inherently riskier because they are
bets.67 However, virtually all financial instruments are bets. An option
contract is a bet on the future price of an asset.68 A guarantee is a bet
by the guarantor that the guaranteed obligation will not default. Even
a loan agreement is a bet by a lender that the borrower will repay the
loan with interest on a timely basis.69

63. E-mail from Timothy E. Lynch, Associate Professor of L., UMKC Sch. of L., to author
(Jan. 2, 2020) (agreeing “that all derivatives can be reduced to options and what [I] call
guarantees”); see also Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives,
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 691 (discussing the “limited number of basic building blocks that
constitute most OTC derivatives products”); Alireza M. Gharagozlou, Unregulable: Why
Derivatives May Never Be Regulated, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 269, 293–94 (2010)
(“Derivatives are contracts entered into by willing and informed parties, for the age-old purpose
of risk allocation. Parties have entered into such arrangements in one form or another for
millennia.”).
64. Professor Lynch suggests that “even guarantees can be reconstructed as options and vice
versa.” E-mail from Timothy E. Lynch, supra note 63. Even if some (or all) of what this Article
calls guarantees can be reconstructed that way, all derivatives would still fall within this Article’s
categories of option contracts and guarantees—namely, traditional financial instruments.
65. Cf. supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (discussing Warren Buffet’s description of
derivatives as financial weapons of mass destruction and the media’s portrayal of AIG’s
derivatives problems as a poster child for the financial crisis).
66. This discussion in Section B is adapted from Steven L. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of
Financial Contracts: Theory and Regulatory Implications, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1327, 1336–39 (2019)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts].
67. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 2, at 6 (characterizing derivatives contracts as bets, given that
they are “agreements between parties that one will pay the other a sum of money that is
determined by whether or not a particular event occurs in the future”).
68. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (observing that an option contract gives one
party the right to buy an asset from, or to sell an asset to, another party at a specified price in the
future).
69. See Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1336.
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Others argue that derivatives are inherently riskier than other
financial instruments because they are much more volatile given that
“[u]nlike other contracts, the value of [derivatives contracts] typically
can change rapidly based on the fluctuating value of the underlying
assets or collateral, prevailing market conditions and other factors.”70
That volatility, the argument goes, can create the possibility of
indeterminate liability. Consider, for example, an interest-rate swap in
which Party A exchanges its fixed interest-rate payments for Party B’s
floating-rate payments. If interest rates fall, the argument goes, Party
A will take a loss that cannot be precisely quantified ex ante because it
will depend on the magnitude of the interest-rate change.
That argument fails to recognize, however, that derivatives
counterparties usually can estimate the limits of their potential
liability.71 In the foregoing example, there is indeterminate liability
insofar as the parties cannot know the sign, positive or negative, and
magnitude of the interest-rate change at the time they enter into the
derivatives contract. In reality, however, they will know from market
experience and data modeling the likely maximum range of any
interest-rate change within the timeframe of their contractual
settlement date.72 Thus, if Party A contracts to sell one thousand shares
of XYZ stock to Party B a year hence at seventy dollars per share, its
current market value, then there is indeterminate liability insofar as the
parties cannot currently know how the sign and magnitude of XYZ
stock’s market value will change. In reality, counterparties minimize
this indeterminacy by again relying on market experience and their
ability to calculate the likely maximum range of XYZ stock’s change
within the next year.73
70. Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies;
Treatment of Derivatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regul. Reform, Com. & Antitrust L.
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 40 (2014) (statement of Seth Grosshandler,
Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP).
71. See, e.g., René M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 186 (2004)
(observing that, “[s]ince 1994, regular users of derivatives have made considerable progress in
measuring the risks of derivatives portfolios [and w]ith these tools, firms that use derivatives
regularly know their risks reasonably well,” but cautioning that “these measurement tools do not
always work well”).
72. See, e.g., PAUL G. FERRARA & SEYED ALI NEZZAMODDINI, INTEREST RATE SWAPS –
AN EXPOSURE ANALYSIS 26 (2013), https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/research/
projects/research-2013-interest-rate-swaps.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D7Z-KGUQ] (discussing how
parties estimate their likely exposure to interest-rate change within the timeframe of their
contractual settlement date).
73. See, e.g., infra note 76 and accompanying text (observing that accountants have devised
a range of methodologies to estimate potential liability for even the most complex derivatives).
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Although the foregoing examples are relatively simple,
counterparties usually can estimate the limits of their potential liability
even for much more complex derivatives. In the United States, the
disclosure of this liability is an accounting requirement; derivatives are
to be measured at fair value and reported as either assets or liabilities.74
The goal is to ensure parties provide the “credible, transparent, and
comparable financial information” that undergirds “the efficient
functioning of the economy.”75 To facilitate this required disclosure,
accountants have devised a range of methodologies to estimate
potential liability for even the most complex derivatives.76
In short, derivatives are not inherently riskier than the option
contracts and guarantees they functionally represent.77

74. 3 ACCT. STANDARDS CODIFICATION § 815-10-10 (FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. 2020).
The standards set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board are recognized by the SEC as
“‘generally accepted’ for purposes of the federal securities laws.” Commission Statement of Policy
Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities
Act Release No. 8221, Exchange Act Release No. 47,743, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,028, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,333 (May 1, 2003).
75. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT FASB 1 (2007), https://www.fasb.org/cs/
BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175818791156
&blobheader=application%2Fpdf [https://perma.cc/ZS7T-U3HQ].
76. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS FOR DERIVATIVE
CONTRACTS 1, 5–6 (2014), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-credit-valuationadjustments-for-derivative-contracts/$FILE/EY-Applying-FV-April-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S8CK-LQSH]. This publication discusses various approaches for calculating valuation
adjustments to value derivatives contracts “at fair value.” Id. Fair value, in this context, is defined
by International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) 13 as “the price that would be . . . paid
to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement
date,” INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS FOUND., IFRS 13: Fair Value Measurement, in IFRS
STANDARDS, at A669, A673 (2020), http://eifrs.ifrs.org/eifrs/bnstandards/en/IFRS13.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LRS4-WF7E]. The Deloitte accounting firm defines fair value under IFRS 13 more
intuitively as “how much the reporting entity has to pay to a market participant such that the
market participant is willing to take over the liability.” DELOITTE LLP, CLEARLY IFRS:
SUMMARY GUIDANCE AND PRACTICAL TIPS FOR IFRS 13 – FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT 1
(2014), https://www.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/Documents/audit/ca-en-audit-clearlyifrs-fair-value-measurement-ifrs-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJC9-XUAK]. The “most advanced
approach” is the Expected Future Exposure (“EFE”) approach, which is used by banks and other
financial institutions with large derivative portfolios and can be “used for many types of
derivatives.” ERNST & YOUNG, CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS FOR DERIVATIVE
CONTRACTS, supra, at 5–6. Because the EFE approach “can be very complex and . . . needs to be
executed by quantitative experts and requires access to significant IT systems,” many firms “have
adopted alternative approaches for estimating” liability on their derivatives contracts. Id.
77. See Feder, supra note 63, at 721 (“[M]any of the risks that are common to most OTC
derivatives are common to other financial instruments as well.”).
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II. ANALYZING DERIVATIVES RISK

Although derivatives are not inherently riskier than option
contracts and guarantees, there is little doubt that derivatives
sometimes create very significant risk. This Part first argues that CDS
contracts, which constitute financial guarantees, can be exceptionally
risky. Thereafter, it argues that CDS contracts that have one or more
systemically important counterparties can become systemically risky
and that the absence of an insurable-interest requirement can further
magnify that risk.
A. Financial Guarantees, and Thus CDS Contracts, Can Be
Exceptionally Risky
For at least four reasons, financial guarantees are riskier than
other types of guarantees: they ensure against unpredictable future
events, in contrast with non-financial guarantees; they are subject to
more economy-wide risks; they overrely on quantitative modeling and
thus are more subject to bias;78 and they guarantee instruments that can
become correlated.
First, financial guarantees ensure against unpredictable future
events. All guarantees are risky, of course, because they ensure future
events. Non-financial guarantees, though, normally ensure reasonably
predictable events. Consider typical property-and-casualty and life
insurance, for instance, which comprises the great bulk of non-financial
guarantees. Traditionally, insurance companies will not insure events
absent rigorous statistical and actuarial data.79 Financial obligations, in
contrast, tend to be sui generis and harder to predict. For example,
decades of residential mortgage-loan data did not predict the
unprecedented 2007–2009 housing-price decline, which was greater
than during the Great Depression. Even the rating agencies failed to

78. For a discussion of the impact of biases, see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating
Financial Guarantors: Abstraction Bias as a Cause of Excessive Risk-Taking, 11 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Guarantors], https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3431345 [https://perma.cc/K5ZG-L3BD].
79. See, e.g., CHARLES NYCE, AM. INST. FOR CHARTERED PROP. CAS. UNDERWRITERS/
INS. INST. AM., PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS WHITE PAPER 2 (2007), http://www.the-digitalinsurer.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/78-Predictive-Modeling-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KS2T-3ELB] (demonstrating insurance companies’ use of predictive analytics and explaining that
proprietary data, as well as data from “numerous third party sources,” allow insurance companies
to develop predictive models by which to determine premiums).
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predict that decline.80 Moreover, there are “no standardized
agreements or controls that exist” for over-the-counter debt
securities.81
Second, financial guarantees are also subject to greater
uncertainty than other guarantees because they are more exposed to
“systematic,”82 economy-wide risks. Non-financial guarantees are less
susceptible to economy-wide risks because a guarantor can better
diversify its coverage. In property-and-casualty life insurance, for
example, insurers normally can diversify their risks sufficiently to
accurately estimate their future losses, enabling them to price their
insurance accordingly.83 A financial guarantor, however, cannot easily
diversify its coverage because most, if not all, financial obligations are
affected systematically—that is, in the same orderly way—by economywide risks such as interest rate changes, inflation, recessions, and war.84
Third, in light of the foregoing uncertainties, financial guarantors
are prone to overrely on quantitative models, which provide a
(sometimes unjustified) sense of comfort.85 These models, in turn, can
80. See, e.g., CORELOGIC, EVALUATING THE HOUSING MARKET SINCE THE GREAT
RECESSION 4 (2018) (noting S&P’s precrisis model that housing prices could fall as much as 20
percent, whereas they actually fell around 33 percent—more than their fall in the Great
Depression); cf. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO.
L. J., 1177, 1234 (2012) (discussing the failure of rating agencies to provide reliable ratings on
MBS because of the securities’ lack of “multicycle experience” and the variety of “collateral,
borrower strength, and credit enhancements” across deals, none of which are alike).
81. Protiviti KnowledgeLeader, What is Financial Instrument Risk?, KNOWLEDGELEADER
(Jan. 25, 2018, 5:13 PM), https://info.knowledgeleader.com/financial-instrument-risk [https://
perma.cc/G3S6-4CPV].
82. Systematic risk means “risk that cannot be diversified away and therefore affects most,
if not all, market participants.” Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 9, at 204. Systematic risk is
different than systemic risk, which refers to risk that could undermine the ability of the financial
system to function as a network. Id.
83. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, John Biggs, Hanh Le, Matthew Richardson & Stephen Ryan,
Systemic Risk and the Regulation of Insurance Companies, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECT OF GLOBAL FINANCE 241 (Viral V. Acharya,
Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew Richardson & Ingo Walter eds., 2011) (“In competitive markets,
insurers price diversifiable risks on an actuarial basis, yielding tremendous utility gains to the
previously exposed individuals and businesses.”).
84. See id. at 253 (noting that nontraditional insurance activities are more exposed to
macroeconomic variables); Matthew C. Turk, The Convergence of Insurance with Banking and
Securities Industries, and the Limits of Regulatory Arbitrage in Finance, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 967, 989–99 (discussing the convergence of traditional insurance and finance).
85. See, e.g., Raphaële Chappe, Edward Nell & Willi Semmler, The Financial Crisis of 2008
as Cognitive Failure: An Overview of Risk over Uncertainty, 57 BERKELEY J. SOCIO. 9, 23 (2013)
(discussing problems with the mathematical models that were used precrisis for MBS risk
management and arguing that by unreliably predicting the magnitude and frequency of rare
events, they allowed investors to “get lulled with a false sense of security”).
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foster cognitive biases—implicit simplifications of how one perceives
reality.86 For example, optimism bias can cause financial guarantors to
believe they can quantify unquantifiable risks.87 While parties to any
financial contract may be subject to optimism bias,88 financial
guarantors are also subject to another important cognitive bias.
Because they do not actually transfer their property at the time they
make a guarantee, financial guarantors may view their risk-taking
more abstractly than, say, a lender that advances its own funds to a
borrower.89 This “abstraction bias” causes financial guarantors to
underestimate the risk,90 even after discounting for the fact that
payment on a guarantee is a contingent obligation.91 Empirical findings
confirm that abstraction bias is real and that it can influence even
sophisticated financial guarantors.92
Fourth, the instruments underlying financial guarantees can
become correlated. And as they become correlated, so do the risks on
the guarantees. This occurred, for example, when home-mortgage-loan
obligations became correlated during the financial crisis.93 Lenders
believed that repayment of those obligations was diversified by the
variation in regional housing prices, not recognizing that nationally all
housing prices were overvalued. In 2007, housing prices throughout the
86. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2018).
87. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 661 (1999) (“When the pertinent events are not
easily predictable and the feedback is not unambiguous, experts tend to be even more
overconfident than laypersons.”).
88. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1366 (2011) [hereinafter Anabtawi & Schwarcz,
Regulating Systemic Risk].
89. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Guarantors, supra note 78 (manuscript at 5).
90. Id.
91. Posit, for example, that a firm is deciding between two options: to lend $1 million to a
borrower for a year with 3 percent interest and a 0.5 percent chance of the borrower defaulting
on payment; or to guarantee a one-year $1 million loan made by another lender to the same
borrower (and thus with the same 0.5 percent chance of default), for a guarantee fee having the
same economic value. Although the expected value of these options to the firm would be
equivalent, abstraction bias would cause the firm to view the guarantee option less seriously. Id.
(manuscript at 5 n.23).
92. See generally id. (comparing the pricing of otherwise parallel risk-taking by financial
firms that invest capital at the outset of securitization transactions and by financial guarantors of
those transactions, and finding that the initial investors demand substantially higher pricing than
the financial guarantors for taking the same amount of risk).
93. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 5–20
(2008), https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/
2008/02/pdf/_text.ashx [https://perma.cc/8UPX-66LH].

SCHWARCZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

REGULATING DERIVATIVES

11/16/2020 7:38 PM

563

country dropped precipitously, and borrowers generally began
defaulting on their mortgage loans.94 It often is difficult to foresee these
correlations.95 Furthermore, the degree of loss on a guarantee of a
financial obligation can be up to the full amount of that obligation.96
The risk analysis on guarantees might not always take that degree of
loss into account.97
The failure rate of financial guarantors confirms these risks.
Consider the example of insurance companies that guarantee the
payment of principal and interest to investors on bonds and other debt
securities.98 Of the nine such insurers operating prior to the financial
crisis, all but one failed—a failure rate much higher than that of
banks.99
CDS contracts fit within the category of financial guarantees.100 It
therefore is no surprise that scholars have labeled them as “the
derivative instrument most implicated in the recent financial crisis”101
94. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60
S.C. L. REV. 549, 550–52 (2009).
95. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 211, 223–24 (2009) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets];
see also infra notes 193–95 and accompanying text (illustrating why it often is difficult to anticipate
correlations in advance and why hidden correlations are only observable when there is full
appreciation of the underlying variables).
96. Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, On the Management of Financial Guarantees, 21 FIN.
MGMT. 87, 91 (1992) (“The guarantor firm bears the full downside risk as if it were the owner of
the collateral assets.”); see also PRUDENTIAL FIN., INC., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 206 (2015), http:/
/www3.prudential.com/annualreport/report2015/annual/images/Prudential-AR2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X6TL-Y2NT] (“The Company’s maximum amount at risk under [its] credit derivatives
equals the aforementioned notional amounts [i.e., principal and accrued interest on the
underlying obligations on which Prudential sold credit protection] and assumes the value of the
underlying referenced securities [i.e., their principal and interest payable thereunder] become[s]
worthless.”).
97. See generally Merton & Bodie, supra note 96 (describing risk-management methods for
financial guarantors and the methods’ associated difficulties).
98. See, e.g., D. Dulani Jayasuriya, Icarus of the 21st Century: The Rise and Fall of
Monoline/Bond Insurers 2 (Jan. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3318631 [https://perma.cc/P6N2-XGMT].
99. Id. at 19–26. Data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) show that
twenty-five banks failed in 2008, 140 failed in 2009, and 157 failed in 2010. Quarterly Banking
Profile, 5 FDIC Q., no. 4, 2011, at 5 tbl.I-A, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011vol5-4/fdic-quarterly-vol5no4.pdf [https://perma.cc/AES8-P3XD]. For the years of 2008, 2009,
and 2010, there were 8305, 8012, and 7658 banks reporting to the FDIC, respectively, for failure
rates of 0.3 percent, 1.7 percent, and 2.1 percent, respectively. Id.
100. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (discussing why CDS contracts epitomize
financial guarantees).
101. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How To Make a
Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (2014); see also Michael
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as well as the riskiest type of derivatives contract.102 AIG’s near
failure,103 for example, resulted from defaults under CDS contracts.104
More recently, JP Morgan Chase lost $6 billion betting on the strength
of CDS instruments.105
B. Having One or More Systemically Important Counterparties Can
Magnify CDS Risk
Financial-guarantee risk is magnified when the guarantee contract
has one or more systemically important counterparties. And, notably,
CDS contracts often have at least one such counterparty.106 This
magnifies the risk because systemically important counterparties tend

Greenberger, Too Big To Fail U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy: Converting an Obscure Agency
Footnote into an “At Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the Multi-Trillion Dollar
Financial Swaps Market 29–30 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 74, 2018),
https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_74.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBP3-7FKQ]
(arguing that “CDS (especially ‘naked’ CDS) fomented” the financial crisis, and citing
“economists, regulators, investigating commissions, market observers, and financial columnists”
who agree that CDS “played” a “central role” in that crisis (footnotes omitted)).
102. Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO.
L.J. 387, 391 (2013).
103. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (discussing the use of derivatives by AIG
and its near failure).
104. See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 10, at 320 (observing that CDS investors commenced
collection actions against AIG because of the collapse of the MBS market, which threatened
AIG’s financial integrity).
105. JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affs., 113th Cong. 4 (2013) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). The bank’s London
desk executed a series of complicated trades that would profit if corporate bond indexes rose,
with the intention of hedging itself from the risk of default on the loans it held on its books. See
Daniel Wilchins & Carrick Mollenkamp, JPMorgan’s Future Losses at the Mercy of an Obscure
Index, REUTERS (May 17, 2012, 12:21 AM), https://reut.rs/JPOPkZ [https://perma.cc/F5573LQK]. One index, the Markit CDX NA IG Series 9, maturing in 2017, was a portfolio of CDS
contracts. Id. That index tracked the credit quality of 121 high-quality bond issuers, including
Kraft Foods and Walmart. Id. When JP Morgan’s trades started losing money, many other traders
began taking the opposite position. They hoped to profit from JPMorgan’s loss, thus
compounding it. Id.
106. See Christopher S. Dwight, Note, Missed (Inter)Connections: Proposed Revisions to the
Federal Reserve’s Approach to Financial Stability Analysis Under the Bank Holding Company Act,
18 N.C. BANKING INST. 599, 603 (2014) (arguing that derivatives counterparties often engage in
multiple transactions with systemically important firms); Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R.
Morrison, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: What Role Can the Bankruptcy Code Play?, in SYSTEMIC
FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES 347, 351 (Douglas D. Evanoff &
George G. Kaufman eds., 2005) (finding that relatively few banks control the derivatives market
and that seven U.S. banks hold more than 95 percent of the U.S. national derivatives exposure).
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to do business with like counterparties,107 creating an
interconnectedness that drives systemic risk.108 The failure of a
systemically important counterparty can lead to a domino effect,
triggering a chain of failures.109
The U.S. government bailed out AIG, a systemically important
protection seller on multiple CDS contracts, to prevent such a domino
effect.110 The failure of Lehman Brothers, another systemically
important firm, is widely believed to have precipitated the financial
crisis.111 Consistent with these observations, economists at the New
York Federal Reserve Bank and finance scholars at Yale contend that
a derivatives contract can “create[] systemic risk” when a default
“seriously impair[s] the financial condition of one or more of its
[systemically important] counterparties.”112

107. See, e.g., Mila Getmansky, Giulio Girardi & Craig Lewis, Interconnectedness in the CDS
Market, 72 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 62, 76–78 (2016) (“Overall, the interconnectedness of the CDS
market is largely attributable to end users that transact with a relatively small number of dealers,
who then manage net exposures by trading among themselves.”).
108. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic
Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 704 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral]; see also
Getmansky, Girardi & Lewis, supra note 107, at 76–79 (“The picture that emerges is one of a
network that is relatively robust to the disappearance of a random node but potentially vulnerable
if a few highly connected dealers should fail.”). This interconnectedness creates risk regardless of
the position of a systemically important counterparty: if a protection seller, the counterparty
might fail—like AIG—because it cannot make the payments; if a protection buyer, the
counterparty might fail because it will not get paid.
109. James Bullard, President & Chief Exec. Officer of Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, Systemic
Risk and the Macroeconomy: An Attempt at Perspective (Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.stlouisfed.org/
from-the-president/speeches-and-presentations/2008/systemic-risk-and-the-macroeconomy-anattempt-at-perspective [https://perma.cc/JDD3-RJBM]. But see Paul Glasserman & H. Peyton
Young, Contagion in Financial Networks, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 779, 826 (2016) (reviewing
literature on financial contagion and concluding that more research is needed to understand how
risks are transmitted); Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy
Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15, 15–16 (2015) (arguing
that counterparty failure may not be a significant source of systemic risk, and that the “‘domino’
contagion view of distress . . . is theoretically flawed and empirically false”).
110. William K. Sjostrom Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 977–79 (2009).
111. See, e.g., Viral Acharya, Thomas Philippon, Matthew Richardson & Nouriel Roubini,
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies, 18 FIN. MKTS. INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS
89, 93 (2009) (stating that Lehman’s bankruptcy “led to the near collapse of the financial system”);
Laurence Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Introduction and Summary 7–8 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22410, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22410.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VCA6-AZS7] (discussing Lehman’s collapse).
112. Rosalind Z. Wiggins & Andrew Metrick, The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The
Special Case of Derivatives, 1 YALE J. FIN. CRISIS 151, 167 (2019) (quoting with approval a New
York Federal Reserve study).
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C. The Absence of an Insurable-Interest Requirement Can Further
Magnify CDS Risk
Currently, a CDS protection buyer or seller is not required to have
an “insurable interest” in the financial obligation for which it buys or
sells protection.113 A CDS contract for which the protection buyer lacks
such an insurable interest is often called a “naked” CDS.114 Naked CDS
contracts have heightened risk for two related reasons. First, in theory,
they can be used purely for speculation,115 which is thought to magnify
risk by creating an unlimited multiplier effect:

113. CHRISTOPHER L. CULP, ANDRIA VAN DER MERWE & BETTINA J. STÄRKLE, CREDIT
DEFAULT SWAPS 144–45 (2018); see also Stout, supra note 2, at 6 (making the same observation).
Likewise, there currently is no legal requirement that a beneficiary of a guarantee have an
insurable interest in the financial obligation that is guaranteed. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 2, at 21
(describing the enactment of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which
provided the “wholesale removal of centuries-old restraints on off-exchange derivatives
speculation”).
114. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Naked Came the Speculators, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/business/10gret.html [https://perma.cc/DEQ2ADC6]. This Article avoids computational details in defining what constitutes a naked CDS. An
actual CDS contract might only partially protect an insurable interest. See 111 CONG. REC. 3944
(2010) (proposal of Sen. Byron Dorgan) (proposing an amendment to the Restoring American
Financial Stability Act to ban naked CDS transactions and distinguishing between CDS and
naked CDS contracts on the basis of two criteria: whether the protection buyer owned valid credit
instruments that matched the CDS’s reference entity, and whether the value of the protection
buyer’s credit instruments was equal to or greater than the notional amount of the CDS). Without
precisely comparing the value of the protection buyer’s insurable interest to the amount of CDS
protection purchased, this author’s visceral reaction is that value that is reasonably equivalent to
that amount should avoid being naked. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (observing that
the insurable-interest requirement merely dictates that an insured derive a benefit from the
continued existence of the insured entity). Clearly, for example, one thousand dollars of CDS
protection sold to an owner of one hundred dollars of bonds should be naked CDS protection—
at least to the extent of nine hundred dollars of the CDS contract. Cf. Lynch, supra note 5, at 76–
77 (observing that it “is possible—and, indeed, common—for a counterparty to a single
derivatives contract to be both hedging a pre-existing risk and speculating simultaneously”).
115. See, e.g., Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante & Ali Rais Shaghaghi, ‘Too Interconnected
To Fail’ Financial Network of US CDS Market: Topological Fragility and Systemic Risk, 83 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 627, 631 (2012) (“The so-called naked CDS buy position is, therefore, a
speculative one undertaken for pecuniary gain from either the cash settlement in the event of a
default or a chance to offset the CDS purchase with a sale at an improved CDS spread.”).
However, even a naked CDS contract can be viewed as a traditional guarantee because
guarantees, unlike insurance contracts, do not need to have an “insurable interest” to be valid.
See supra note 113; cf. Stout, supra note 2, at 4 (observing that, prior to the twentieth century, the
common law applied a doctrine called “the rule against difference contracts” to discourage
derivatives that did not serve a hedging purpose by treating them as unenforceable wagers). But
see Stout, supra note 2, at 14 (“Despite judicial concern about the negative economic impacts of
gambling, the common law did not prohibit parties who wanted to wager through speculative
derivative contracts from doing so.”).
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[B]etting on market events can create new risk that is an order of
magnitude larger than the risk associated with the underlying market
phenomenon. A highly confident derivatives speculator, for example,
might happily sell $1,000,000 in CDS contracts on a $100,000 bond.116

Second, naked CDS contracts also are thought to magnify risk by
fostering moral hazard.117 At common law, there is an insurableinterest requirement mandating that a person who takes out insurance
must derive some benefit from the continued existence of the insured
person or property.118 This requirement helps reduce moral hazard by
decreasing the incentive for the person taking out the insurance to kill
the insured person or destroy the insured property in order to collect
on the insurance policy.119
Without such a requirement, naked CDS contracts are susceptible
to similar dangers. Professor Timothy Lynch argues, for example, that
purely speculative derivatives “increase[] the opportunities to engage
in societally injurious regulatory arbitrage and may create moral
hazards and conflicts of interest for corporate executives and corporate
creditors.”120 Industry observer Nathaniel Dutt argues that a naked
CDS “will reduce an incentive to monitor or accurately appraise

116. Stout, supra note 2, at 10.
117. Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L.
REV. 1243, 1319–20 (2011); cf. Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit
Default Swaps Bring Down AIG and Lehman Brothers, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. BRIEF 15, 20 (2008)
(arguing that at least some of AIG’s use of CDS contracts included naked CDS contracts).
118. Alexander Charap, Minimizing Risks, Maximizing Flexibility: A New Approach to
Credit Default Swap Regulation, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 127, 156 (2011) (“The insurable interest
requirement is a common law doctrine which dictates that an insured must derive a benefit,
financial or otherwise, from the continued existence of the insured entity. Absent an insurable
interest, an insurance contract may be void.”).
119. Id. at 157; Lynch, supra note 5, at 49 (“The primary reason for implementing the
insurable interest rule is that without it, an undesirable moral hazard may be created. A nonhedging policyholder would have incentive to murder an insured person or destroy insured
property.”). The problem of moral hazard is that “persons protected from the negative
consequences of their risky actions will be tempted to take more risks.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Too
Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 761
(2017) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Too Big To Fool].
120. Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely Speculative
Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 67, 74 (2011) [hereinafter Lynch, Gambling by Another
Name]. But compare Stout, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing that speculative derivatives trading is a
zero-sum game that exposes both parties to “new risks without providing any compensating
increase in aggregate returns”), with MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E.
TAHYAR, FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 1165 (2d ed. 2018) (observing that any
“derivative’s payoff structure is normally zero-sum”).
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certain risks.”121 For example, he suggests that “a bank that makes
loans and then purchases a CDS to reduce the risk of a borrower
default will have a reduced incentive to monitor the loans.”122 Although
the CDS protection seller would thereby gain that incentive, he argues
that the “bank is in the best position to” engage in that monitoring.123
In summary, derivatives are not inherently riskier than the
traditional option contracts and guarantees they functionally
represent. However, at least one subset of guarantees—CDS contracts
with systemically important counterparties—can seriously threaten
economic stability, and their speculative nature and the absence of an
insurable-interest requirement can further magnify that threat.
III. DERIVATIVES REGULATION IS OFTEN FLAWED
By starting from the flawed premise that most derivatives are
uniquely risky, the consequent derivatives regulation is also often
flawed. Section A shows that derivatives regulation often starts from
this flawed premise, and Section B shows that such derivatives
regulation, which includes aspects of the G20 regulatory scheme (and
thus U.S. law, which follows that scheme124), can simultaneously
overregulate and underregulate derivatives in ways that can
inadvertently concentrate systemic risk.
A. Derivatives Regulation Often Presumes that Most Derivatives Are
Uniquely Risky
By following the G20 regulatory scheme,125 U.S. derivatives
regulation has shifted “from a laissez-faire paradigm to a bank
regulatory paradigm focused on safety and soundness.”126 To ensure
safety and soundness, U.S. law requires most derivatives, often

121. Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap Regulatory Initiatives: A
New World Standard of Just a Ploy, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 184 (2009).
122. Id. It is questionable, however, whether that example represents naked CDS if the bank
is buying CDS protection on a loan it still owns.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (introducing the G20 and its regulatory
scheme for derivatives).
126. Arthur W.S. Duff & David Zaring, New Paradigms and Familiar Tools in the New
Derivatives Regulation, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 677, 678 (2013).
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regardless of their type127 and contractual counterparties,128 to be
cleared129 and settled130 through central counterparties (“CCPs”).131

127. Compare supra note 31 and accompanying text (observing that market participants
recognize four types of derivatives contracts), with Paul M. McBride, The Dodd-Frank Act and
OTC Derivatives: The Impact of Mandatory Central Clearing on the Global OTC Derivatives
Market, 44 INT’L L. 1077, 1102 (2010) (arguing that “[b]y expansively defining the terms Swap and
Security-Based Swap to include most options and swap transactions, along with any agreement
that subsequently becomes commonly known as a swap,” the Dodd-Frank Act “ensures that the
clearing requirements are broadly applicable and capture the different types of derivative
products that currently exist or that may arise in the future”).
128. The Financial Stability Board suggests that regulators should consider exempting
derivatives without systemically important counterparties from central clearing requirements:
The impact of an entity on financial stability from OTC derivatives is likely to depend
on the extent of their activity. Lower levels of OTC derivatives activity, all else equal,
are likely to result in a lower impact. Thus, while the financial stability benefits from
central clearing by [counterparties with lower levels of derivatives activity] can still
exist, the gains are likely to be smaller than those for entities in the systemic core,
particularly relative to the costs . . . . [Standard setting bodies therefore] may merit
consideration . . . of [not imposing the central clearing] reforms on market participants
that are not considered systemically important.
FIN. STABILITY BD., INCENTIVES TO CENTRALLY CLEAR OVER-THE-COUNTER (OTC)
DERIVATIVES 4 (2018) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY BD., INCENTIVES TO CENTRALLY CLEAR],
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R191118-1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F2B-5R4C]; see also
Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral, supra note 108, at 712 (“Incongruously, the [U.S.
bankruptcy law] safe harbor [for derivatives] operates independently of the size of the
counterparty or its portfolio. . . . By failing to take systemic importance into account, the safe
harbor extends well beyond its purported rationale of reducing systemic risk.”).
129. Clearing is “the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming
transfer orders prior to settlement.” EUR. CENT. BANK, GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATED TO
PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2009), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
other/glossaryrelatedtopaymentclearingandsettlementsystemsen.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2YK9EQV]. It involves identifying the obligations of the parties to the transaction. See id.
130. Settlement is “the completion of a transaction or of processing with the aim of
discharging participants’ obligations through the transfer of funds and/or securities.” Id. at 24.
131. See, e.g., Derivatives, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml
[https://perma.cc/6J52-XYRC] (explaining that Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act and followup
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), require that most derivatives contracts be centrally cleared
through CCPs).
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CCPs are well-capitalized entities132 often associated with derivatives,
commodities, or other securities exchanges.133
The goal of this central clearing requirement, which applies only
to derivatives, is to reduce counterparty risk.134 By legally substituting
its credit for that of the contracting parties, the CCP becomes the
primary counterparty on both sides of the derivatives contract—for
example, the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.135
Central clearing thereby reduces individual counterparty risk136 by
ensuring the performance of a derivatives contract even if a contracting
party fails.137
Like the United States, many other countries follow the G20
regulatory scheme to require the central clearing of derivatives, often
regardless of their type.138 As of mid-October 2019, for example,
132. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1329, 1358. But see
Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1287, 1291–94 (2010) (arguing that CCPs should be even better capitalized); Paolo
Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” Is Not Enough, the
Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601, 604 (2017) (discussing the agency
costs and risks associated with different ownership models for CCPs); Paolo Saguato, The
Unfinished Business of Regulating Clearinghouses, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 55–64 (offering
policy solutions to strengthen CCPs’ resilience).
133. The three largest U.S. CCPs, for example, are CME Clearing Services, which provides
clearing and settlement of exchange trades on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago
Board of Trade; ICE Clear U.S., which is owned by New York Stock Exchange parent company
Intercontinental Exchange; and LCH, which is a unit of the London Stock Exchange Group. See
Clearing Firms, CME GRP., https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/financial-and-regulatorysurveillance/clearing-firms.html [https://perma.cc/TPY2-2TBE] (providing a list of clearing
firms); Michelle Price, Three Biggest U.S. Clearing Houses Pass Liquidity Stress Tests: CFTC,
REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2017, 12:08 AM), https://reut.rs/2idTBEd [https://perma.cc/6PJJ-A9SJ]
(naming CME Clearing, ICE Clear U.S., and LCH Ltd as the three largest U.S. clearing houses).
134. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1330; cf. Duff &
Zaring, supra note 126, at 702 (discussing the federal regulatory mandate to assure the “safety
and soundness” of derivatives, regardless of their type).
135. See, e.g., PETER NORMAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS 7 (2011) (“By becoming the buyer
to every seller and the seller to every buyer, the CCP assures completion of the trade if a trading
partner defaults.”); Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 862 (2014) (“The clearinghouse interposes itself between the parties, serving as the
counterparty to each. Instead of selling the cattle future to Buyer, Seller sells it to the
clearinghouse, which sells an identical future to Buyer.”). The substitution of credit is legally
referred to as a “novation,” which arises when a new party assumes a payment obligation that was
incurred by a debtor on a contract and the original debtor is totally released from the obligation.
66 C.J.S. Novation § 1 (2020).
136. Counterparty risk is the risk that a contracting party’s default will harm other parties to
the contract. NORMAN, supra note 135, at 9.
137. Id. at 7.
138. See generally Heckinger et al., supra note 24 (summarizing the regulatory history of the
central clearing mandate for derivatives contracts).
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“[e]ighteen
jurisdictions
have
in
force
comprehensive
standards/criteria for determining when standardised OTC derivatives
should be centrally cleared . . . .”139 “Standardized” derivatives include
virtually all derivatives that are “documented on ISDA forms.”140 That
is a “very low bar” because derivatives commonly are documented on
those forms.141
U.S. and foreign derivatives regulation that follows the G20
regulatory scheme thus requires most derivatives, but no other type of
financial instrument, to be centrally cleared to reduce their risk.
Effectively, therefore, that regulation treats most derivatives as
uniquely risky.
B. Derivatives Regulation that Starts from that Flawed Premise Is
Also Flawed
The flawed premise that most derivatives are uniquely risky has
given rise to “a derivatives regulatory regime that often appears
confusing, incomplete, contradictory, greatly subject to interpretation,
incapable of addressing derivatives innovation, and even at times,
simply irrational or incomprehensible.”142 Existing regulation not only
overregulates derivatives in some ways and underregulates them in
others but also concentrates—and thereby, inadvertently may
increase—systemic risk.
The central clearing requirement, for example, overregulates
derivatives because it applies to most derivatives, often regardless of
their type or their counterparties.143 Existing regulation also
underregulates derivatives by inadequately addressing what this
Article later describes as systemically risky CDS contracts.144

139. FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: 2019 PROGRESS REPORT
IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P151019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JB8Z-MAR8] (“In a few of these 18 jurisdictions a wider range of products is now
subject to mandatory clearing.”).
140. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1372.
141. Id.
142. Lynch, supra note 5, at 13.
143. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
144. See infra Parts IV.B & IV.C; see also FIN. STABILITY BD., REVIEW OF OTC
DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS EFFECTIVENESS AND BROADER EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS
§ 3.2.1, at 12 (2017), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P290617-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V44W-6D7D] (reporting that the rate of central clearing has increased more for interest-rate
derivatives than for CDS contracts and estimating the global rate of CDS central clearing was
only 28 percent at end-December 2016, although that represents a sharp increase from 5 percent
at end-June 2009). But see Houman B. Shadab, Counterparty Regulation and its Limits: The
ON
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Recognizing that CDS derivatives were the type most responsible for
causing the financial crisis, several governmental organizations
contemplated specifically regulating the CDS market.145 Ironically, the
faulty perception that most derivatives are uniquely risky diverted
regulatory attention from CDS contracts alone to derivatives
generally.146
Although intended to reduce risk,147 central clearing could
inadvertently increase systemic risk by “shift[ing] counterparty risk”
from individual counterparties to the CCP, thereby concentrating the
risk.148 Even the Financial Stability Board, the G20 body that originally
proposed the central clearing requirement, is becoming concerned that
central clearing might increase, rather than reduce, systemic risk.149
The G20 regulatory scheme also proposes minimum margin
requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives.150 “Posting margin”

Evolution of the Credit Default Swaps Market, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 689, 705 (2010) (arguing
that CDS risk-management practices have always been “generally adequate,” and that “the
broader infrastructure of the CDS market [has always] remained generally stable” except for “the
very small portion of the market whereby an unregulated subsidiary or affiliate of an insurance
company [presumably referring to AIG] sold too much CDS protection referencing certain
banking institutions’ mortgage-backed CDOs”).
145. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time To Regulate Over-theCounter Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 124 (2009) (discussing efforts by the SEC and
the President’s Working Group on the financial crisis to centralize the CDS market and plans,
later dropped, by New York State to regulate CDS contracts as insurance).
146. See, e.g., Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 235–41 (2011) (describing the Dodd-Frank Act’s wide
regulatory ambit that reaches not only CDS derivatives but the OTC derivatives market as a
whole).
147. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
148. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 88, at 1395; see also Mark
J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1692 n.123, 1697 (2013)
(collecting sources on whether central clearing reduces or merely shifts counterparty risk from
individual counterparties to the CCPs); Ivana Ruffini, Central Clearing: Risks and Customer
Protections, 39 ECON. PERSP. 90, 97 (2015) (observing that central clearing creates systemic costs
by concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs); Yadav, supra note 102, at 389 (challenging the
“regulatory and academic consensus” by arguing “that clearinghouses, as presently conceived,
are sorely ill-equipped to contend with the complex legal and economic risks of the credit
derivative”).
149. See FIN. STABILITY BD., INCENTIVES TO CENTRALLY CLEAR, supra note 128, at 3
(observing that “[s]urvey responses and market outreach are also consistent with a view that
concentration in clearing service provision could amplify the consequences of the failure” of a
“major” derivatives counterparty). Economists also argue that the central clearing of CDS
transactions could reduce netting efficiency if done separately. Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu,
Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD.
74, 90 (2011).
150. Over-The-Counter Derivatives, supra note 24.
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refers to providing securities or other liquid assets as collateral to
secure a counterparty’s obligation to settle a derivatives contract. For
example, a CDS protection seller that would be obligated to pay $1
million if the CDS contract were settled on that day might, if the
contract so provided, be required to provide the protection buyer with
(at least) $1 million of securities to collateralize that obligation.
Presuming that most derivatives are uniquely risky, minimum margin
requirements are supposed to ensure that derivatives counterparties
who are unprotected by central clearing at least are adequately
protected by collateral.151 Margin requirements, however, can be a
mixed blessing. Although they can help to protect against counterparty
default,152 margin requirements also can lead to unpredictable
liquidity-funding demands if the counterparty lacks sufficient liquid
assets to post.153 Indeed, AIG’s near failure resulted from its inability
to satisfy CDS margin requirements.154
More significantly, it is dubious whether regulators should impose
formulaic155 margin requirements on sophisticated derivatives
counterparties who presumably know best how to control their own
risk and have incentives to do so.156 Those counterparties can, and

151. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM’NS, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES 3 (2015)
[hereinafter BASEL COMM. ET AL., MARGIN REQUIREMENTS], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/
d317.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY8A-3GYN]; COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC,
JOINT REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL SWAP REGULATION 25 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2012/sec-cftc-intlswapreg.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK5Q-KA54].
152. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 95, at 232–33
(discussing how margin requirements can help to protect against counterparty default).
153. Id.; see also Diana Milanesi, Risk/Benefit Analysis of Central Clearing of Over-theCounter (OTC) Derivatives and a Chaos Theory-Based Perspective on Clearing Mandates 197
(Summer 2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), https://escholarship.org/
content/qt8nz4n9z9/qt8nz4n9z9.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6N5-HS6P]; Craig Pirrong, The
Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates, CATO INST. 3 (July 21, 2010), https://object.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA665.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CEZ-UDKH] (observing that “imposing
margin requirements” can limit risk but is “socially costly”).
154. See supra note 10. But cf. Patrick Fitzgerald & Marie Beaudette, Lehman Wasn’t Felled
by JP Morgan Collateral Calls, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2012, 2:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303360504577410353589465814 [https://perma.cc/59N7-7VYQ] (reporting the
Treasury Secretary’s position that “the government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in
the days before Lehman’s Sept. 15, 2008, Chapter 11 filing resulted in institutional investors and
clearing banks ‘pulling away’ from financial institutions, including Lehman, and was the real
reason that the investment bank entered a death spiral”).
155. For instructions on how to calculate these margin requirements, see 17 C.F.R. § 23.154
(2020).
156. Although sophisticated derivatives counterparties may know “best,” they do not
necessarily know perfectly.
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normally do, balance their own costs and benefits when contracting
about their rights and obligations to post margin.157 In this regard, the
G20’s minimum margin requirements for non-centrally cleared
derivatives parallel the G20’s questionable risk-retention, or “skin-inthe-game,” requirements for securitization transactions.158 Those
securitization requirements either overlook, or ignore, that it was
always common practice for sponsors of securitizations to retain
substantial risk on the underlying loans they sold.159 Indeed, other
securitization counterparties demanded the sponsors do so, as a matter
of commercial reality, to protect themselves.160 Thus, the real-world
impact of the G20’s risk-retention requirements may well be de
minimis, at best.161
At worst, however, the false appearance of a regulatory “solution”
can be dangerous.162 The risk-retention requirement might give the
appearance of solving the problem of securitization’s abuses, but it

157. See, e.g., INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, LEGAL GUIDELINES FOR SMART
DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS: COLLATERAL 15 (2019), https://www.isda.org/a/VTkTE/LegalGuidelines-for-Smart-Derivatives-Contracts-Collateral.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2UL-GFDP]
(stating that “[p]arties may wish to exchange collateral even where there is no obligation under
any relevant regulatory regime to do so,” and providing documentation for parties to do so). In
theory, one might conceive counterparty A demanding less collateral than socially optimal from
counterparty B because counterparty A would be unconcerned about externalities if it ends up
failing due to counterparty B’s default. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. In practice,
though, any such collateral deficiency should be de minimis, if not zero, because counterparty A
commonly would demand, and counterparty B commonly would grant, sufficient collateral to
ensure payment if counterparty B defaults. See Awrey, Split Derivatives, supra note 5, at 500
(discussing how derivatives counterparties use collateral to help protect themselves).
158. See, e.g., Andrew M. Faulkner, Despite Challenges, Risk Retention Rules Set To Impact
All Asset-Backed Securities by End of 2016, SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
(Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/04/despite-challenges-riskretention-rules-set-to-imp [https://perma.cc/52QC-QJJ5]. The risk-retention requirements were
mandated by a G20 summit in September 2009. See G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit,
TRINITY COLL. UNIV. TORONTO (2019), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html
[https://perma.cc/W4M7-GNT3].
159. See Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage
Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—from Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539,
1589–93 (2015) (disputing the notion that risk-retention requirements created moral hazard and
thus contributed to the financial crisis of 2007–2008).
160. Id.
161. Mathew C. Turk, Securitization Reform after the Crisis: Regulation by Rulemaking or by
Settlement?, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 861, 880, 901 (2018).
162. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization: Ten Years After the Financial Crisis, 37 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 757, 762 (2018) (observing that risk retention inadvertently can mislead
securitization investors into thinking they are buying something that is safer than it actually is).
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does not provide a real solution.163 As this Article argues,164 regulatory
solutions to the derivatives problem are likely very different than
imposing artificial margin requirements on sophisticated
counterparties.
Part IV next analyzes how to design more targeted and effective
derivatives regulation. Imperfect as the G20 scheme may be, replacing
it is politically unrealistic. Therefore, this Article designs targeted
derivatives regulation to complement and enhance the G20 scheme.
This follows the well-respected approach of building normative legal
improvements onto an established positive law foundation.165
IV. DESIGNING TARGETED DERIVATIVES REGULATION
Targeted derivatives regulation should focus on regulating CDS
contracts with systemically important counterparties (hereinafter,
“systemically risky CDS contracts”), which can seriously threaten
economic stability.166 Designing such regulation requires a normative
framework suitable for regulating financial instruments. Section A
builds that framework. Section B then uses it to analyze how to
regulate systemically risky CDS contracts that guarantee insurable
interests. Thereafter, Section C uses the same framework to analyze
how to regulate naked systemically risky CDS contracts—namely,
those that do not guarantee insurable interests.167 Recognizing that
even the best regulation cannot eliminate CDS risk, Section D
examines how to regulate the failures that inevitably will occur. Finally,
the Appendix to this Article proposes model language to implement
these regulatory recommendations.
A. Building a Normative Framework for Financial Regulation
Cost-benefit analysis provides a standard justification for financial
regulation—the benefits of the proposed regulation should be

163. See id. at 760–69 (examining how to fix securitization’s abuses and rebuild confidence).
164. See infra Part IV (analyzing how to design targeted derivatives regulation).
165. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Empowering the Poor: Turning De Facto Rights into
Collateralized Credit, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7 n.32 (2019).
166. See supra Part II.B. CDS contracts that lack any systemically important counterparties
should be regulated like ordinary financial guarantees. However, financial guarantee risk is
magnified when the guarantee contract has one or more systemically important counterparties.
Id.
167. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (defining naked CDS contracts as those for
which the protection buyer lacks an insurable interest).
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expected to exceed its costs.168 This presents a puzzle, though, when
applied to sophisticated financial firms that engage in derivatives
transactions generally, much less systemically risky CDS transactions.
Those firms presumably know best how to control their own risk. They
also have incentives to control risk to protect their investors. If those
firms govern themselves accordingly, regulation appears to be
unjustified because it would not provide any net benefits. Perhaps for
these reasons, bank regulation—which likewise involves sophisticated
financial firms that know how, and have incentives, to control risk—
“rarely mandates a specific way [for banks] to mitigate risk, [that is,]
whether to take out insurance or to take assets as collateral etc.”169
However, recognizing that the essential purpose of financial
regulation is to correct market failures can solve this puzzle.170
Sophisticated financial firms that perfectly control their risk-taking to
protect investors still might harm other parties, including customers,
contractors, and even members of the public.171 This third-party harm
represents a market failure, known as an externality.172
Corporate governance law does not normally require firms to
control these.173 Instead, regulation and tort law customarily are used
to control material externalities. For example, government deposit
insurance is commonly thought to distort a deposit-taking bank’s risk-

168. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial
Regulation, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (2014) (arguing that financial regulation should be subject to
cost-benefit analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124
YALE L.J. F. 263, 263 (2015) (“Cost-benefit analysis is best understood as a way for agencies to
ensure that their decisions are informed.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
the Environment, 115 ETHICS 351, 354 (2005) (defending the use of cost-benefit analysis for
environmental regulation).
169. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1363 & n.197 (citing
Peter O. Mülbert, Managing Risk in the Financial System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION 365, 395 (Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015)).
170. Id. at 1363 & n.198 (first citing DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS IN THE 1990S, at 21 (1990); then citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995)).
171. Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2016) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Misalignment].
172. Although economists often categorize externalities as a type of market failure,
externalities more precisely are caused by market failures—in this case, risk-taking that causes
uninternalized externalities. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and
Responsibility Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1799–1800 (2013).
173. Under the norm of shareholder primacy, firm managers should act in the interests of
their investors. This author has questioned whether strict shareholder primacy should apply to
the governance of systemically important firms, or whether managers of those firms should have
some form of a public governance duty, see generally Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note 171.
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taking because, if the bank fails as a result of risk-taking, much of the
cost of its failure would be externalized onto the government and
taxpayers.174 To help correct that distortion and control externalities,
regulators commonly impose capital requirements on banks.175
This same regulatory framework can inform the regulation of
systemically risky CDS contracts. The law does not purport to—nor
should it—regulate all risky contracting. Absent paternalism, which is
inappropriate to protect the (mostly) sophisticated parties to
systemically risky CDS contracts, the purpose of regulating those CDS
contracts should be to control material externalities. Even with
sophisticated financial firms as counterparties, systemically risky CDS
contracts could cause such externalities—a systemically important
protection seller’s default leading to its failure, or a protection seller’s
default causing a systemically important protection buyer’s failure,
could cause a financial collapse that harms the real economy.176
Regulation that helps to control these externalities is justified, then, if
its benefits can be expected to exceed its costs.177
B. Regulating Systemically Risky CDS Contracts that Guarantee
Insurable Interests
Next, this Section considers possible regulatory approaches,
including their costs and benefits, to help control the material
externalities caused by systemically risky CDS contracts, particularly
those contracts that guarantee insurable interests. As a threshold
observation, the size of the CDS market appears to justify appropriate

174. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1363 &
n.200 (noting “that ‘[a] financial safety net constituted by deposit insurance’ can lead to market
failure because ‘[i]n good times, bank shareholders do well, while in extremely bad times the
insurance fund bails out the bank’s depositors and debtholders’” (alterations in original) (quoting
Robert L. Hetzel, Should Increased Regulation of Bank Risk-Taking Come from Regulators or
from the Market?, 95 ECON. Q. 161, 166 (2009))).
175. Id. at 1363 & n.201 (highlighting scholarship determining “that bank capital regulation
is necessary ‘to reduce the negative externalities resulting from government-imposed deposit
insurance’” (quoting George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, The Appropriate Role of Bank
Regulation, 106 ECON. J. 688, 688, 694–96 (1996))).
176. See supra notes 10–11, 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing the near failure of AIG
and the consequences of a systemically important firm’s failure).
177. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. Cost-benefit analysis effectively constitutes
a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis—in this Article’s case, that the aggregate benefit to the
contracting parties exceeds the aggregate harm. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of
Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 551–52, 561 (1999). Kaldor-Hicks is the
real-world operating definition of efficiency. Id. at 560–61 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13–14 (5th ed. 1998)).
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regulation. Although CDS contracts constitute only a fraction of
derivatives contracts, their notional amount is in the tens of trillions of
dollars.178 Sections B.1–B.3 examine innovative regulatory approaches.
Section B.4 then reexamines the G20 regulatory scheme’s approaches.
1. Limiting Credit Exposure. Limiting the credit exposure of
systemically important firms on systemically risky CDS contracts could
help control externalities by reducing the likelihood that such a firm
would become unable to pay its CDS obligations, leading to its default
and failure. One type of credit-exposure limit—a “protection seller
limit”—could restrict a systemically important protection seller’s
“correlated” CDS liabilities to an aggregate amount it could feasibly
pay.179 A protection seller limit would control externalities by avoiding
a default that causes the protection seller’s failure.180 Such a limit has
precedent, for example, in U.S. regulation imposing credit limits on
financial guarantees represented by standby letters of credit.181
Another type of credit-exposure limit—a “protection buyer
limit”—could restrict the amount of aggregate protection a
systemically important firm could buy from “correlated” CDS
protection sellers to an amount that would enable the firm to continue
operating without being paid.182 A protection buyer limit would control
externalities because a protection seller’s default would not thereby

178. BIS Statistics: Charts, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2017 annex at A1, A16, https://www.bis.org/
publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1703.pdf [https://perma.cc/29W8-A498]. The notional amount generally does not
reflect the amount at risk on a derivative; it merely refers to the value of underlying assets
specified in the derivatives contract. See, e.g., APANARD (PENNY) PRABHA, KEITH SAVARD &
HEATHER WICKRAMARACHI, MILKEN INST., DERIVING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
DERIVATIVES 27 (2014), https://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/ResearchReport/
PDF/Derivatives-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CKQ-ANDS] (“[N]otional amounts outstanding,
though a rough measure of derivatives activity, do not represent . . . generally, the amount at
risk.” (citations omitted)). Because CDS contracts guarantee debt obligations, their notional
amount is the principal plus the accrued interest outstanding on those obligations. See supra note
96.
179. See infra notes 192–95 and accompanying text (analyzing correlated CDS liabilities).
180. See supra text accompanying note 176 (observing that the failure of a systemically
important firm can cause material externalities).
181. See, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, The Emerging Law of Standby Letters of Credit and Bank
Guarantees, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 332–33 (1982). Banks also must report at least the amounts of
their outstanding standby letters of credit on their financial statements. 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(d)
(2020).
182. See infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (analyzing correlated CDS protection
sellers).
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trigger the protection buyer’s failure.183 U.S. regulation has used similar
limits, for example, by imposing lending limits on banks,184 which
restrict the loans repayable to the bank from any given customer to an
amount that would enable the bank to continue operating without
being paid.185
Several practical challenges would accompany credit exposure
limits. For one, only systemically important firms would need to be
regulated in this way because the failure of a non-systemically
important firm should not lead to material externalities. In jurisdictions
like the United States, where regulators already designate relevant
firms as systemically important, this particular challenge should be
minimal—although the trend under the Trump administration to
retract the systemically important designation process could renew the
challenge.186
Other practical challenges, such as setting protection seller limits
and protection buyer limits, could be more difficult. Such limits would
need to be set for each systemically important firm.187 In an analogous

183. See infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (observing that a protection seller’s
default that causes a systemically important protection buyer’s failure can cause material
externalities).
184. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Rojc, National Bank Lending Limits–A New Framework, 40 BUS.
LAW. 903, 906–07 (1985).
185. See id. at 903, 906–07 (observing that lending limits restrict national banks from lending
more than the value of 15 percent of their unimpaired capital to a single customer).
186. See, e.g., Authority To Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies, 84 Fed. Reg. 71,740, 71,742 (Dec. 30, 2019) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310
app. A) (introducing new guidance that “substantially transforms” the SIFI designation process
for nonbank financial institutions “to cost-effectively minimize burdens”); John Heltman,
Prudential, the Last Nonbank SIFI, Sheds the Label, AM. BANKER (Oct. 17, 2018, 9:08 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/prudential-the-last-nonbank-sifi-sheds-the-label [https://
perma.cc/QY74-LYEE].
187. This could be done either by regulators setting the limits by fiat or through a give-andtake process between regulators and regulated firms. Although this Article primarily discusses
the former, there is some precedent for the latter. Cf. Lori S. Bennear & Jonathan B. Wiener,
Adaptive Regulation: Instrument Choice for Policy Learning over Time 7–8 (Feb. 12, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/
Regulation%20-%20adaptive%20reg%20-%20Bennear%20Wiener%20on%20Adaptive%20
Reg%20Instrum%20Choice%202019%2002%2012%20clean.pdf [https://perma.cc/478A-ATHX]
(describing a process of “adaptive regulation” that “enables learning and modification of policy
over time via adjustments informed by data collection and analysis”). The merits of any particular
methodology designating systemically important firms are beyond the scope of this Article, but it
is worth noting that identifying a methodology to correctly identify systemically important firms
is itself a considerable practical challenge. An overinclusive methodology may subject firms to
potentially harmful capital requirements without protecting the public from any material
externalities from that firm’s failure, see Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool, supra note 119, at 779, while
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context, U.S. regulators formulaically set equivalent limits188 and use
the same formula for both bank standby-letter-of-credit exposure (the
equivalent of this Article’s protection seller limit189) and bank lending
exposure (the equivalent of this Article’s protection buyer limit190). For
instance, “federal regulatory agencies have required banks under their
jurisdiction to count standby[] [letters of credit] toward each
customer’s section 84 lending limits.”191
Perhaps the most difficult practical challenge would be identifying
correlations. To set a protection seller limit, for example, regulators
would have to identify correlated CDS liabilities.192 A systemically
important firm that sells protection to different counterparties should
count its CDS liabilities as correlated to the extent a particular, even if
unlikely, event can synchronize their payment. Thus, although AIG
sold protection to numerous unaffiliated protection buyers, it faced
default when the seemingly geographically diversified MBS underlying
many of those buyers’ CDS contracts faced a correlated loss in value
due to widespread MBS market panic.193 In retrospect, that correlation
might appear to have been obvious; in reality, though, it is often

an underinclusive methodology will necessarily expose the public to unmitigated material
externalities in the event of an unincluded systemically important firm’s failure.
188. Cf. supra note 185 and accompanying text (referencing lending limits calculated at 15
percent of a bank’s unimpaired capital).
189. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
191. Kozolchyk, supra note 181, at 332–33. Although it would have to be updated on a regular
basis to remain accurate, a more nuanced protection buyer limit might take into account not only
the financial condition but also, to the extent not already disclosed, each protection seller’s
contingent CDS liabilities. This could help a protection buyer assess each such protection seller’s
ability to perform its CDS obligations. See Houman B. Shadab, Guilty by Association? Regulating
Credit Default Swaps, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 407, 416 (2010) (arguing that disclosure of
AIG’s liabilities as a CDS protection seller might have alerted protection buyers, and possibly
even regulators, to the AIG situation). Imposing such a disclosure requirement on protection
sellers should not be costly. Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(d) (2020) (providing already that “all . . . standby
letters of credit must be adequately reflected on the bank’s published financial statements”).
Generally accepted accounting principles already require the disclosure of certain loss
contingencies in financial statements, although usually in notes to the statement, including
“[g]uarantees of indebtedness of others.” FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION
§ 460-10-50-2 (last updated Aug. 14, 2020) (requiring disclosure even if “the possibility of loss
may be remote”).
192. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 10, 93 and accompanying text. Although immaterial to this Article’s
analysis, AIG’s immediate default threat was, on a purely technical level, being unable to post the
necessary mark-to-market collateral to secure its protection buyers, rather than being unable to
pay its underlying CDS obligations to those protection buyers. See Henkel, supra note 10, at 97–
98.

SCHWARCZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

REGULATING DERIVATIVES

11/16/2020 7:38 PM

581

difficult to anticipate correlations in advance.194 Indeed, “hidden
correlations are only observable when there is full appreciation of the
underlying variables.”195
Similarly, to set a protection buyer limit, regulators would have to
identify correlated CDS protection sellers.196 Those correlated entities
normally should include all of a protection seller’s affiliates197 and any
other members of a protection seller’s “common enterprise.”198 But
because different criteria are relevant to setting protection seller limits
versus setting protection buyer limits, regulators should not take the
relatively simplistic approach—which U.S. bank regulators took in a
different context199—of setting the same limit for both.
The foregoing analysis has shown that limiting CDS credit
exposure could provide substantial benefits by helping to control
systemic externalities. Indeed, if AIG had been subject to a protection
seller limit that restricted its aggregate credit exposure to MBS, it
might not have faced defaulting on its CDS obligations.200
The benefits of limiting CDS credit exposure appear to exceed its
costs, most of which would be imposed by the above-discussed practical
challenges. The most difficult practical challenge would be identifying
correlations, but even imperfectly identifying them should provide real
benefit by reducing the likelihood of a systemically important firm’s
failure. If limiting CDS credit exposure still preserves the bulk of the
CDS market, that market’s pricing efficiencies should continue, and
any other costs should be marginal.201 CDS contracts still would be

194. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
195. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 95, at 223. During the
late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, “investors failed to recognize an underlying correlation
between mobile-home loans and the price of oil. An oil boom in Oklahoma drew an influx of oil
workers, creating the nation’s fastest growing market for mobile-home loans.” Id. at 223–24.
Then, “[w]hen oil prices crashed, drilling in Oklahoma ceased, resulting in massive
unemployment and causing widespread defaults on the mobile-home loans.” Id. at 224.
196. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Groups of Companies, 66 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 181, 181,
210 (2018) (discussing the correlated creditworthiness of affiliated companies).
198. Cf. Rojc, supra note 184, at 919, 921–24 (observing that loans made to a bank’s customer
are also attributed to those with whom the customer forms a “common enterprise,” which
includes the customer’s affiliates).
199. See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text (observing that U.S. regulators set the
same limit for both bank standby-letter-of-credit exposure and bank-lending exposure).
200. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
201. Systemically important firms still could engage in CDS transactions so long as their CDS
exposure does not subject them to default. See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.
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available to hedge credit risk with relatively low transaction cost,202 to
provide standardization and liquidity to otherwise fragmented bond
markets,203 and to facilitate price discovery in equity markets.204 From
a cost-benefit standpoint, therefore, limiting credit exposure appears
to be a viable regulatory approach for controlling the externalities
caused by systemically risky CDS contracts that guarantee insurable
interests.
2. Correcting Cognitive Biases. Correcting the cognitive biases
that motivate protection sellers’ excessive risk-taking is another way to
control the externalities caused by systemically risky CDS contracts.205
Although human nature is not easily changed, studies have shown that
cognitive biases can be addressed and sometimes improved.206
Professors Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have argued, for example,
that such biases can be regulated through an approach they call

202. See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, International Law and the Economic
Crisis: Clearing Credit Default Swaps, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 646–47 (2010) (discussing the
transaction-cost benefits for a reference entity of transacting in the CDS market rather than in
the bond market itself); Douglas B. Levene, Credit Default Swaps and Insider Trading, 7 VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 231, 252–53 (2012) (“[A] credit default swap contract is an attractive alternative to
selling a loan or a bond[:] . . . keeping the credit on the bank’s books has benefits for managing
the bank’s overall relationship with the client [and] . . . avoids any necessity to obtain the
borrower’s consent to the assignment of a loan.”).
203. See Martin Oehmke & Adam Zawadowski, The Anatomy of the CDS Market, 30 REV.
FIN. STUD. 80, 103–04 (2017) (“Overall, our evidence supports the view of the CDS market as an
alternative trading venue that [effectively facilitates financing] for firms with fragmented and
contractually heterogeneous bonds, which are illiquid and costly to trade.”).
204. See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84 J.
FIN. ECON. 110, 138 (2007) (providing “empirical evidence that there is an information flow from
the credit default swap markets to equity markets”). Regulation might also inadvertently reduce
another possible, though narrower, benefit—the ability of CDS pricing to help assess whether a
failed leveraged buyout (“LBO”) should be avoided as constructively fraudulent. Michael
Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight
Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 122 (suggesting that
bankruptcy courts could use CDS pricing to help determine “whether a corporate debtor who has
filed for bankruptcy was solvent” after giving effect to the LBO).
205. Yet another approach to control the externalities caused by systemically risky CDS
contracts would be to impose a public governance duty on systemically important counterparties
to such contracts. See, e.g., supra note 173 (questioning whether managers of systemically
important firms should have some form of a public governance duty).
206. See, e.g., David Z. Hambrick & Alexander P. Burgoyne, The Difference Between
Rationality and Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2cM5MDU [https://
perma.cc/J3XB-KFBN] (describing a pair of studies published by psychologist Carey Morewedge
and colleagues that found that computer training led to decreases in decision-making bias).
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“debiasing through law.”207 The goal is to give people more control
over their processing of information.208 Regulators could do this by
making an event more “available” to individuals, such as by exposing
them to a concrete instance of the event’s occurrence.209 Ironically, this
approach uses one type of cognitive bias—availability heuristics210—to
correct other cognitive biases.
For example, smokers are more likely to believe that smoking will
harm their health if they are exposed to specific, poignant, and concrete
narratives rather than general information regarding health risks.211
One study showed that foreign cigarette package warnings that are
more pictorially graphic than U.S. text-only warnings are more
effective in discouraging smoking.212 To reduce credit-card abuse,
scholars have similarly suggested giving consumers “vivid—perhaps
even shocking—information about real cases [of that abuse] that have
gone wrong.”213
These debiasing strategies can inform CDS regulation.214 For
example, regulators might consider explicitly warning CDS protection
sellers of optimism bias and abstraction bias.215 Even a simple reminder
207. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200
(2006).
208. ROY F. BAUMEISTER & BRAD J. BUSHMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN
NATURE 155 (2d ed. 2011); see Cass R. Sunstein, People Prefer System 2 Nudges (Kind of), 66
DUKE L.J. 121, 131–32 (2016) (arguing that people are generally more receptive to requirements
that allow them to exercise flexibility and agency than to more cut-and-dried rules such as
requiring a display of graphics).
209. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 210.
210. Availability bias is the tendency to focus on a recent or especially vivid example.
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 88, at 1366–67. People with recently
divorced friends, for example, tend to overestimate the divorce rate. Id. at 1367 n.72.
211. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 210.
212. See generally Hua-Hie Yong, Ron Borland, James F. Thrasher, Mary E. Thompson,
Gera E. Nagelhout, Geoffrey T. Fong, David Hammond & K. Michael Cummings, Mediational
Pathways of the Impact of Cigarette Warning Labels on Quit Attempts, 33 HEALTH PSYCH. 1410
(2014) (comparing Canadian, Australian, United Kingdom, and U.S. cigarette-package
warnings).
213. See, e.g., Oskari Juurikkala, The Behavioral Paradox: Why Investor Irrationality Calls
for Lighter and Simpler Financial Regulation, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 33, 56 (2012).
214. Cf. Frank Partnoy, Five Years After Lehman’s Collapse, Bankers Still Haven’t
Confronted Their Biases, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sep. 16, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/09/five-yearsafter-lehmans-collapse-bankers-still-havent-confronted-their-biases [https://perma.cc/7NSB-779A]
(arguing that because “modern financial markets tempt human beings into cognitive error,”
bankers should be taught the limits of human cognition).
215. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (discussing those biases). In this Article’s
context, recall that optimism bias is the tendency for financial guarantors to believe they can
quantify unquantifiable risks. Relatedly, abstraction bias is the tendency for financial guarantors
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that cognitive biases have caused sophisticated parties to be
devastatingly wrong in the past can encourage more critical reflection
and accurate risk assessments.216 Regulators might also consider
requiring credit officers of CDS protection sellers to attend lectures
that emphasize that warning and caution against optimism and
abstraction bias. Supplementing warnings with lectures has been
shown to reduce cognitive biases more effectively than merely
providing warnings.217
Regulators also could try to reduce optimism and abstraction
biases further by making the possibility of having to pay on the CDS
more concrete. For example, they could consider requiring at least
systemically important protection sellers to engage in the type of stress
testing currently mandated for government-designated systemically
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).218 SIFIs must engage in
periodic financial “stress test” scenarios219 to motivate them to consider
the possibility of, and to better prepare for, future periods when
to view their risk-taking more abstractly, and thus underestimate their risk, because they do not
actually transfer their property at the time they make a guarantee.
216. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 88, at 1389. Although
some may argue that after the financial crisis, financial guarantors already should see the
possibility of another failure as “available,” the reality is that even the most sophisticated parties
have relatively short memories when making investment decisions. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The
Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV.
393, 418, 422 (2006) (“The availability bias means that, as time passes since the last financial crisis,
regulators and policymakers discount the potential for new crises and the need for regulations to
avert those crises.”); cf. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without
Notice, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 1993, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/199303-28/bondholder-beware-value-subject-to-change-without-notice [https://perma.cc/2HSV-K6X3]
(observing that bondholders generally chose higher interest rates, thereby “go[ing] for the gold,”
over protective event-risk covenants within only a few years after an event that seriously harmed
unprotected bondholders).
217. See Markku Kaustia & Milla Perttula, Overconfidence and Debiasing in the Financial
Industry, 4 REV. BEHAV. FIN. 46, 47, 57 (2012).
218. To the extent systemically important protection sellers already are designated by the
federal government as SIFIs—which may well be the case for many—this proposed stress-testing
requirement would supplement any already-mandated stress testing. For the criteria for which
institutions receive a SIFI designation, see Daniel Liberto, Systemically Important Financial
Institution (SIFI), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
systemically-important-financial-institution-sifi.asp [https://perma.cc/NW79-5MEG]. For a list of
current SIFIs, see Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs), FIN. STABILITY
BD., https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/policy-development/addressing-sifis/global-systemicallyimportant-financial-institutions-g-sifis [https://perma.cc/5YU8-CC38].
219. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 46–47 (2011) [hereinafter
BASEL COMM., A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96ZW-BSTJ]. For a discussion of SIFI designation, see supra notes 186, 218.
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previously adequate liquidity and capital resources might prove
inadequate.220 Officials from the Federal Reserve maintain that these
tests create a “strong, accountable, and proactive risk culture.”221 CDS
stress testing might posit, for example, that a protection seller is
required to pay multiple CDS contracts simultaneously. This
requirement would be consistent with a framing approach: by better
understanding potential adverse outcomes, protection sellers should be
able to assess risks more accurately.222
From a cost-benefit standpoint, correcting cognitive biases should
be inexpensive. As discussed, it likely would involve explicitly warning
systemically important CDS protection sellers of optimism and
abstraction bias and requiring their credit officers to attend lectures
that emphasize that warning and caution against those biases.
Additionally, it might subject those protection sellers to periodic stress
tests that motivate them to consider the possibility of, and to better
prepare for, having to make future payouts during financially difficult
conditions. In contrast, correcting cognitive biases should provide
important benefits, such as reducing optimism and abstraction bias and
creating a “strong, accountable, and proactive risk culture.”223
Although correcting cognitive biases would not control the
externalities caused by systemically risky CDS contracts as clearly as
limiting credit exposure, it should provide an important regulatory
supplement to that approach.
3. Setting Capital Requirements. Another avenue to control the
externalities caused by systemically risky CDS contracts is to set special
capital requirements on systemically important protection sellers.224
220. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 217 (2012).
221. Charles L. Evans, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., The Call
for Proactive Risk Culture 3 (June 3, 2015), https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/
speeches/2015/060315-chicago-banking-symposium-charles-evans-print-pdf.pdf [https://perma. cc/
TRY6-UQ2R] (“It is incumbent on financial institutions to serve as their own first line of defense.
A strong risk culture enables institutions to proactively identify and manage not only broad risks,
but also risks that are specific to their business.”).
222. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 216 (“A strategy of debiasing through substantive
law in response to consumers’ optimism bias is to require that firms identify the potential negative
consequences associated with their product or a particular use of their product rather than the
positive consequences associated with (for instance) an alternative usage.”).
223. See Evans, supra note 221.
224. If and when regulators gain experience with setting special capital requirements on
systemically important protection sellers, they could consider whether also to set special capital
requirements on systemically important protection buyers.
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The goal would be to make such protection sellers robust enough to
resist failure. These capital requirements could resemble—or
supplement, in the case of protection sellers already subject to capital
requirements—the risk-based capital requirements imposed on banks
and other SIFIs225 and the claims-reserve requirements imposed on
insurance companies.226 Risk-based capital requirements are intended
to protect firms both against unexpected losses227 and against becoming
excessively leveraged228 by requiring them to hold minimum levels of
capital, usually equity.229
Systemically important firms are already subject to risk-based
capital requirements,230 and certain of those firms are subject to riskbased capital surcharges for derivatives exposure generally.231
Regulators should analyze whether those requirements are sufficient
to address CDS protection-selling risk and, if not, whether additional
risk-based capital requirements may be appropriate. As part of that
analysis, regulators should attempt to balance the benefits and costs of
imposing supplemental requirements, recognizing that the costs are
uncertain. Some economists argue that risk-based capital requirements
have little associated public cost; others argue to the contrary.232 The
225. See BASEL COMM., A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, supra note 219, at 12–29.
226. A claims reserve, sometimes called a balance-sheet reserve, is an actuarially determined
amount of money set aside by insurance companies to pay policyholders. See Daniel Liberto,
Claims Reserve, INVESTOPEDIA (May 15, 2009), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/claimsreserve.asp [https://perma.cc/9TCL-WRM7].
227. Kern Alexander & Steven L. Schwarcz, The Macroprudential Quandary: Unsystematic
Efforts To Reform Financial Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS
REGULATION 127, 136 (Ross P. Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2016).
228. See Hervé Hannoun, Deputy Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Basel III
Capital Framework: A Decisive Breakthrough 10 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.bis.org/speeches/
sp101125a.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ2T-VHMQ] (proposing a leverage ratio, “a simple measure
of capital that supplements the risk-based ratio and which constrains the build-up of leverage in
the system”).
229. In its most pristine form, capital consists of equity. See id. at 3–4 (explaining why the
Basel III regulatory framework defines capital in terms of common equity).
230. See supra notes 186, 218–19, 225–26 and accompanying text (discussing SIFIs and other
firms that are subject to risk-based capital requirements).
231. See generally, e.g., Wayne Passmore & Alexander H. von Hafften, Are Basel’s Capital
Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Banks Too Small?, 15 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 107
(2019) (discussing G-SIB risk-based capital surcharges).
232. Compare ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 98 (2013) (arguing that higher
capital requirements on banks would have no associated public costs), with Jean Dermine, Bank
Regulations After the Global Financial Crisis: Good Intentions and Unintended Evil, 19 EUR. FIN.
MGMT. 658, 662 (2013) (arguing that higher capital requirements “might lead to inefficiently
higher interest rates on bank loans . . . [and also] induce social costs as banks reduce their supply
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misapplication of capital requirements also could have substantial
costs.233 Because of these uncertainties, this Article does not
recommend setting additional risk-based capital requirements to
control CDS protection-selling risk.
4. Reexamining the G20 Regulatory Scheme. Because replacing
the G20 regulatory scheme—which purports to reflect a twenty-nation
international regulatory consensus—is politically unrealistic at this
stage, the foregoing regulatory approaches are intended to
complement and enhance that scheme, imperfect as it may be.
Consider, for example, central clearing, the principal focus of the G20
scheme. Central clearing applies to most derivatives and is intended to
reduce counterparty risk by ensuring the performance of a derivatives
contract, even if a counterparty fails.234 The foregoing regulatory
approaches would enhance central clearing by more specifically
targeting the riskiest derivatives—systemically risky CDS contracts.
Without arguing to replace the G20 scheme, this Article
nonetheless critiques it. For example, the Article has observed that
central clearing inadvertently could increase systemic risk by
concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs.235 Yet if central clearing
ultimately proves to reduce systemic risk, as the G20 suggests, it
certainly should be appropriate to clear and settle derivatives contracts
centrally. But if this is true, then it may also be appropriate to centrally
clear and settle other financial contracts involving systemically
important counterparties.236 The rationales for this expanded use of
central clearing are precisely those advocated in this Article—that

of loans or securitise assets”), and Emilios Avgouleas, Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial
Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective 16–17 (Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper
No. 849, 2015), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_849.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5XP-TVY5]
(arguing that higher capital requirements can create “uncertainty [that] severely undermines
rather than reinforces market discipline”). See also Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still
Being Tallied, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1f4j1Jv [https://perma.cc/ZGW3-LJFR]
(discussing criticisms of capital requirements).
233. See Schwarcz, Too Big To Fool, supra note 119, at 779–80 (observing that capital
requirements generally are imposed on a countercyclical basis, and the mistiming or
misapplication of countercyclical regulation can be devastating).
234. See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text; cf. FIN. STABILITY BD., INCENTIVES TO
CENTRALLY CLEAR, supra note 128, at 1 (“The central clearing of standardised OTC derivatives
is a pillar of the G20 Leaders’ commitments to reform OTC derivatives markets in response to
the financial crisis.”).
235. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
236. See generally Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66 (arguing
for that broader application of central clearing, if central clearing actually reduces systemic risk).
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derivatives contracts generally are not inherently riskier than other
financial contracts237 and that having one or more systemically
important counterparties can magnify counterparty risk for any
financial contract, not just derivatives.238 However, the G20 has yet to
adopt this expanded approach.
In addition to central clearing, the G20 regulatory scheme includes
two other derivatives-reform proposals: first, imposing minimum
margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives
transactions,239 and second, requiring data reporting about OTC
derivatives transactions to government-mandated trade repositories.240
Again, by specifically targeting systemically risky CDS contracts, this
Section’s regulatory approaches would supplement and augment those
proposals. Similarly, this Article critiques those proposals without
arguing to replace them. For example, minimum margin requirements
can create unpredictable liquidity-funding demands, which can cause
counterparty defaults.241 Also, even absent a regulatory requirement,
sophisticated derivatives counterparties normally contract to post
margin at levels appropriate to protect their interests.242 To the extent
the minimum margin requirements impose high costs while providing
relatively few benefits,243 they may not be advisable.
In contrast, the G20’s proposed data reporting requirements are
intended to increase transparency, which can be important given the
complexity of derivatives and the fact that OTC derivatives
transactions are privately negotiated.244 Also, reporting requirements

237. See supra Part I.B.
238. See supra Part II.B.
239. See supra notes 150–64 and accompanying text.
240. See Over-The-Counter Derivatives, supra note 24 (listing the G20’s 2009 derivatives
reforms).
241. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 156–64 and accompanying text. This Article has not independently
assessed a possible second benefit of imposing the minimum margin requirements, which is to
reduce international regulatory arbitrage. See BASEL COMM. ET AL., MARGIN REQUIREMENTS,
supra note 151, at 3–4 (discussing how imposing minimum margin requirements might reduce
regulatory arbitrage and prevent financial institutions that operate in low-margin jurisdictions
from gaining a competitive advantage).
244. See Over-The-Counter Derivatives, supra note 24 (listing the G20’s 2009 derivatives
reforms).
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generally have relatively low costs.245 The Article therefore favors
those requirements.246
C. Regulating “Naked” Systemically Risky CDS Contracts
A naked systemically risky CDS is thought to constitute the
riskiest type of CDS because it does not protect an insurable interest.247
The protection buyer simply may be speculating, for example, on the
creditworthiness of a bond it does not own.248 Some estimate that
naked CDS contracts have “become the more prevalent use of CDS in
the market.”249
1. Addressing Moral Hazard. As discussed, two risks are
associated with naked CDS contracts—moral hazard and a multiplier
effect.250 The moral-hazard risk appears to be exaggerated. The
supposition is that naked CDS protection can motivate financial
institutions to act imprudently by protecting them against the
consequences of their actions. One industry observer, for example,
245. See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Mirko S. Heinle & Chong Huang, The Real Costs of Financial
Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft, 20 REV. FIN. 2151, 2155, 2168 (2016) (observing that
the “actual act of disclosure” tends to be low cost or costless due to advances in electronic
communication and the quantity of information produced for other purposes, but cautioning that
“a high-disclosure policy can still be costly because of its effect on real investment”).
246. At least one commentator questions, however, whether the G20 reporting requirements,
as currently implemented, focus on reporting valuable data. See Sinead Walley, G20 Derivatives
Regulation—Equivalence or Divergence?, ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N (Apr. 23, 2018), https://
www.aima.org/journal/aima-journal-edition-114/article/g20-derivatives-regulation-equivalenceor-divergence.html [https://perma.cc/XH3W-W2RZ] (observing that only “minutiae” is “now
being reported to trade repositories” under the G20 scheme). The extent to which the G20
reporting requirements should be improved, especially for reporting on OTC derivatives
transactions made up of systemically risky CDS contracts, is beyond this Article’s scope.
247. See supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text. Naked systemically risky CDS contracts
also might be riskier than other systemically risky CDS instruments because protection sellers of
naked CDS contracts lack a subrogation claim in an underlying asset that could help to reimburse
them. For example, a guarantor that pays a holder of a defaulted bond becomes subrogated to
the holder’s rights in the bond. Subrogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Even a
defaulted bond may have some value to the guarantor. In naked CDS contracts, however, the
protection buyer lacks rights in any underlying asset; therefore, there are no rights in an
underlying asset for which the protection seller can become subrogated. In some jurisdictions, this
distinction may be irrelevant because the law is not always clear whether CDS protection sellers
actually have a subrogation claim after making payment. See Janis Sarra, Financial Market
Destabilization and the Role of Credit Default Swaps: An International Perspective on the SEC’s
Role Going Forward, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 629, 638 (2009) (“For cash-settled CDSs, unlike
insurance, no title to claim passes and the protection seller receives no right of subrogation.”).
248. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
249. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1088.
250. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
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argues that a bank would be motivated to make risky loans if it could
purchase CDS contracts to reduce the risk of borrower default.251 That
argument, however, lacks business sense. No bank would be able to
purchase creditworthy protection, at a reasonable price, for
guaranteeing risky loans. Furthermore, that example does not even
appear to represent naked CDS contracts.252 A related supposition is
that CDS protection can reduce a lender’s incentives to monitor or
accurately appraise risk.253 This similarly lacks business sense because
no rational CDS counterparty would sell protection on loans without,
itself, monitoring and appraising those loans.254
2. Addressing the Multiplier Effect. The greater risk of a naked
systemically risky CDS is its multiplier effect. For example, naked CDS
contracts can “allow speculators to write $10 trillion in derivative
contracts on a $1 trillion market for mortgage bonds, just as a bookie
can take in $100,000 in bets on a horserace with a $10,000 winner’s
purse.”255 This enables a protection seller to leverage its CDS liabilities
more highly compared to the amount of CDS protection it could sell
on the underlying financial obligation alone.256 If a highly leveraged
protection seller makes a bad bet, it may be unable to pay those
liabilities and will default.257 If that defaulting protection seller is
251. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 122 (questioning whether that industry observer’s example even
represents a naked CDS, given that the bank presumably is buying CDS protection on a loan it
still owns).
253. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
254. The counterargument that the lender “is in the best position to” engage in that
monitoring, see supra note 123 and accompanying text, is naive, ignoring the reality of the massive
financial guarantee industry. Indeed, the above moral-hazard arguments parallel the argument
attributing much of the financial crisis’ excessive risk-taking to the so-called originate-todistribute model of securitization, in which originators of risky loans sell them to third parties.
See, e.g., Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis 1 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Rsch., Working Paper No. 2010-08, 2010), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/cfr/2010/wp2010/2010-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LU9-YN6N]. These sales are
presumed to transfer risk on the loans away from the originators, thereby creating moral hazard
that encourages originators to make even riskier loans. Id. That argument fails to explain,
however, why those third parties—or why investors in and financial guarantors of securitization
transactions sponsored by those third parties—accept that risk.
255. Stout, supra note 2, at 28.
256. Cf. id. (“[Naked CDS contracts] can magnify shocks in underlying markets and amplify
them into risks that are many times larger than the underlying market itself.”).
257. See John Geanakoplos, Leverage Caused the 2007–2009 Crisis, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 235, 248–51 (Douglas
W. Arner, Emilios Avgouleas, Danny Busch & Steven L. Schwarcz eds., 2019) (arguing that
leverage was the primary cause of the financial crisis).
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systemically important, and thus its naked CDS is systemically risky, its
default could threaten economic stability.258
The approaches recommended in Section B for regulating
systemically risky CDS transactions—setting credit exposure limits and
correcting cognitive biases259—also should apply to regulating naked
systemically risky CDS instruments because neither of those
approaches is conditioned on whether the protection buyer has an
insurable interest. Moreover, setting a credit exposure limit on
protection sellers—or in this Article’s parlance, a protection seller
limit—could directly control the multiplier effects of naked
systemically risky CDS contracts and restrict a systemically important
protection seller’s correlated CDS liabilities to an aggregate amount it
could feasibly pay.260 Thus, setting a protection seller limit would
control the multiplier effect’s systemic danger—even if the protection
seller makes a bad bet, it should be able, assuming the protection seller
limit is wisely chosen,261 to pay its naked CDS liabilities.
With one exception, regulation setting credit exposure limits and
correcting cognitive biases for naked systemically risky CDS contracts
should have the same costs and benefits as regulation setting those
limits and debiasing those biases for the other systemically risky CDS
contracts discussed in Section B. The costs and benefits should be the
same because neither of these regulatory approaches turns on whether
the protection buyer has an insurable interest. From a cost-benefit
standpoint, therefore, these regulatory approaches also should be
appropriate for controlling the externalities caused by naked
systemically risky CDS contracts. The exception makes this conclusion
even stronger. Setting credit exposure limits—particularly protection
seller limits—would provide even greater benefit for naked
systemically risky CDS contracts by controlling the multiplier effect.
3. Considering a Ban. Another possible approach to regulating
naked systemically risky CDS contracts would be simply to ban them.
Regulators could do this, for example, by imposing an insurableinterest requirement on all systemically risky CDS contracts. Some

258. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (defining CDS contracts that have one or
more systemically important counterparties as systemically risky CDS contracts).
259. Recall that this Article does not yet recommend a third possible approach—setting
capital requirements. Supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 187–95 and accompanying text (analyzing how to set the limit).
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commentators advocate a ban,262 and the European Union (“EU”)
already has banned the issuance of naked CDS contracts on sovereign
debt issued by the EU or its member states.263
This Article is agnostic on whether naked systemically risky CDS
contracts should be banned. As discussed below, there is insufficient
information to estimate the cost-benefit outcome of a ban. Even
assuming that a ban on naked systemically risky CDS instruments
would considerably further reduce systemic externalities beyond the
reduction achieved by setting credit exposure limits and correcting
cognitive biases, the costs of such a ban would include eliminating the
pricing and other efficiencies of those contracts.
There is unresolved controversy, though, whether naked CDS
contracts actually provide efficiencies and if so, to what extent.264 Some
argue, for example, that the sole purpose of naked CDS contracts is
speculation, which provides no efficiencies.265 A prominent derivatives
scholar thus contends that because naked CDS contracts do not
“provide price discovery benefits,” they cannot “provide[] important
external social benefits in the form of more liquid markets and more
accurate or ‘efficient’ market prices.”266 Although those types of
benefits might result from “[e]xchange-based trading in which multiple
buyers and sellers post their bid and ask prices produc[ing] price

262. See, e.g., Wolfgang Münchau, Time To Outlaw Naked Credit Default Swaps, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2010), https://on.ft.com/3gb7fjB [https://perma.cc/3S77-EGXH]; cf. Hazen, supra note
145, at 134–35 (suggesting that although the “justification” for imposing the insurable-interest
requirement to insurance policies “is paternalism,” which “is controversial since it sacrifices
freedom of contract for what policy makers deem to be consistent with ‘the common good,’”
“policy makers have wisely recognized that a paternalistic approach is appropriate when dealing
with risk-shifting using insurance products [and the] justifications for substantive regulation of
insurance contracts may be equally applicable to derivatives regulation”).
263. Raphael M. Russo, Europe Restricts “Naked” Credit Default Swaps and Short Sales,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 27, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/
12/27/europe-restricts-naked-credit-default-swaps-and-short-sales [https://perma.cc/SDV2-J5AX].
264. Cf. supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text (discussing the pricing efficiencies of nonnaked CDS instruments).
265. See, e.g., Münchau, supra note 262 (“A naked CDS purchase means that you take out
insurance on bonds without actually owning them. It is a purely speculative gamble. There is not
one social or economic benefit.”). Professor Hazen similarly suggests that CDS contracts should
be regulated like insurance in order to reduce moral hazard. Hazen, supra note 145, at 130–31.
That would have the practical effect of prohibiting naked CDS contracts. Mr. Charap observes,
as a matter of positive law, that the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits CDS contracts from being
regulated as insurance contracts under state insurance laws. Charap, supra note 118, at 156.
266. Stout, supra note 2, at 30–31 (making this argument for all OTC derivatives trading,
which includes naked CDS contracts).
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quotations that can be made publicly available,”267 naked CDS
speculation “involves private, bilateral agreements entered between
parties with no obligation to report either the fact of their transaction,
or their transaction terms, to the outside world.”268
Others argue, in contrast, that selling naked CDS protection can
make markets more robust. Sam Jones, a prominent industry observer,
contends that even without price discovery, “there is a palpable social
and economic benefit to naked CDS positions.”269 Using the sovereign
bond market as an example, Jones observes that in 2004, some hedge
funds invested in buying naked CDS protection, for a relatively low
fee, against the possibility of defaults on sovereign bonds—which the
hedge funds did not own—of the Eurozone’s financially weakest
member states, including Greece.270 The hedge funds believed that the
interest rates on Greek bonds were too low and that eventually
investors would appreciate that nation’s risk, causing the prices on
those Greek bonds to fall.271 The hedge funds then purchased at those
discounted prices Greek bonds that matched, as closely as feasible, the
protection on their naked CDS contracts.272 This helped stabilize the
price of Greek debt when few other investors were willing to purchase
those bonds.273 The naked CDS, in other words, facilitated a form of
arbitrage to help correct imperfect market pricing. For this and other
reasons, several derivatives scholars agree that naked CDS contracts
can provide pricing efficiencies, even without price discovery.274
This Article therefore recommends setting credit exposure limits
and correcting cognitive biases to regulate naked systemically risky
CDS contracts. Because the G20’s regulatory scheme does not turn on
267. Id. at 31.
268. Id.
269. Sam Jones, The Benefits of Naked CDS, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2010, 3:59 AM),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2010/03/02/161556/the-benefits-of-naked-cds [https://perma.cc/6HUKRCXE].
270. Id.
271. Id. Greek bond prices would fall if investors eventually appreciate that the interest rates
on those bonds would not fully compensate them. Those investors, therefore, would only offer a
discounted price to purchase those bonds.
272. Jones, supra note 269.
273. Id. (“[T]he boon from hedge funds looking to hoover-up Greek debt is undeniable.”).
274. See Feder, supra note 63, at 719 (“Theoretically, a market can have a perfect balance of
natural long and short hedgers; realistically, however, speculators fill a counterparty void.”);
Lynch, Gambling by Another Name, supra note 120, at 118–19 (“There is little doubt that
speculators add liquidity to the derivatives markets. Most importantly, without speculators,
potential hedgers would have to find other hedgers with an exactly (or nearly exactly) opposite
position . . . . Finding such hedgers . . . may be costly and often impossible.”).
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whether a CDS contract guarantees an insurable interest, these
regulatory recommendations should supplement the G20 regulatory
scheme to the same extent discussed in Section B.275
D. Regulating Failures
Absent banning all systemically risky CDS contracts, which this
Article does not advocate,276 even the best regulatory efforts cannot
completely eliminate CDS risk. Limiting credit exposure, for example,
is unlikely to prevent the occasional failure of systemically important
counterparties. Nor is human nature well enough understood to
completely avoid the influence of cognitive biases, such as optimism
and abstraction biases.
Regulation therefore should not only try to prevent systemically
important failures, as discussed in Sections B and C above, but should
also try to mitigate the harm that inevitable failures can cause. This
dual approach takes inspiration from chaos theory, which holds that in
complex engineering systems—as well as in complex financial
systems—failures are almost inevitable.277 Therefore, CDS regulation
should also focus on limiting the harmful consequences of those
failures.278 Although a comprehensive analysis of such limitations
would be lengthier than this Article allows, a few observations may be
in order.
U.S. law provides important regulatory precedents for limiting
the harmful consequences of failures by requiring firms that are subject
to consequential failures to mutualize their risk—that is, to share the

275. More specifically, this Article’s recommendations for regulating naked systemically
risky CDS contracts should supplement the G20 regulatory scheme to the same extent this Article
has argued that its recommendations for regulating systemically risky CDS contracts guaranteeing
an insurable interest should supplement it.
276. Cf. supra notes 262–74 and accompanying text (advocating against a ban of naked
systemically risky CDS contracts and explaining why it is difficult to assess the merits of such a
ban).
277. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 95, at 248–49. One
aspect of chaos theory is deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more
complex the system, the more likely it is that failures will occur. Id. at 248. Thus, the most
successful (complex) systems are those in which the consequences of failures are limited. Id. In
engineering design, for example, such consequences are limited by decoupling systems through
modularity that helps to reduce a chance that a failure in one part of the system will trigger a
failure in another part. Id.
278. Cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 92, 102 (2013) (developing that argument
for limiting the harmful consequences of inevitable systemic shocks).
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risk among multiple parties.279 In the banking industry, for example,
the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) requires
that deposit-taking banks mutualize their risk by paying into a fund
that reimburses the FDIC for guaranteeing deposit accounts.280 The
FDIC guarantee limits the harm to depositors caused by a bank’s
default and thus reduces the chances of harmful bank runs.281 To
compensate for possible reactor accidents in the nuclear industry, the
Price-Anderson Act likewise requires each owner of a nuclear reactor
to share the risk by contributing collectively to a multi-billion-dollar
self-insurance fund.282 In the traditional insurance industry, states
typically require insurers share the risk by contributing collectively to
a fund that ensures policyholders are paid even if an insurer fails.283 In
the derivatives industry itself, central clearing already represents a
form of risk mutualization to limit counterparty risk.284
To further mutualize CDS risk, regulators could consider
requiring systemically important CDS protection sellers to pay into a
CDS-payment protection fund. The fund would be available to pay
protection buyers in the event of a protection seller’s default.
Furthermore, requiring those CDS protection sellers to make up-front
payments to the fund might even help to reduce their abstraction
bias.285
Some argue that requiring firms to pay into risk-mutualizing
funds could create moral hazard by protecting them against their own
risky action.286 There is, however, a strong argument to the contrary.

279. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1365.
280. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2018).
281. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62
MD. L. REV. 515, 543–44 (2003).
282. U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 1 (2019),
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/ML032730606.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CKP-5PP3].
283. See, e.g., Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, An Optional Federal Charter for Insurance:
Rationale and Design, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55,
90–91 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009) (comparing state insurance funds with the
FDIC deposit fund).
284. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1331, 1365.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90 (describing abstraction bias).
286. For example, the idea of a risk-mutualizing systemic risk fund was originally included in
the bill that would become the Dodd-Frank Act. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 210(n) (as introduced
in House of Representatives, Dec. 2, 2009) (proposing a “Systemic Dissolution Fund” for winding
down failed financial companies that pose a “systemic threat,” with the fund to be maintained by
“risk-based assessments” on large financial institutions). While the original bill did not set a limit
on the size of the fund, id. § 210(n)(5), a parallel Senate bill would have set the target size of the
fund at $50 billion, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 210(n)(5) (as printed Apr. 29, 2010). Senator Richard
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The very requirement to pay into a risk-mutualizing fund, such as a
CDS-payment protection fund maintained by protection sellers, should
motivate those parties to monitor and help control each other’s risktaking. Controlling that risk-taking would help avoid depleting the
fund, thereby saving those parties from having to pay additional
amounts to replenish the fund.287
Regulators also might consider limiting the harmful
consequences of the failures of systemically important CDS
counterparties by requiring those parties to “reinsure” their guarantee
liabilities, as do traditional insurance companies. Reinsurance refers to
insurers contractually transferring portions of their risk, especially in
the case of major catastrophes, to other parties, known as reinsurers.
Reinsurance enables an insurer to pay its policyholders.288 It also helps
to prevent an insurer from failing by enabling it to recover all or part
of the payments it makes to its insured policyholders.289 A complete
analysis of reinsurance, which is highly specialized, is beyond this
Article’s scope.290
This Article therefore recommends targeted derivatives
regulation, a model for which is in the Appendix, that would limit the
credit exposure of systemically important CDS counterparties, try to
correct the cognitive biases that motivate excessive risk-taking by those
counterparties, and try to mitigate any harm to the public caused by

Shelby pushed through an amendment to the Senate bill, arguing that the $50 billion “honey pot”
would increase moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts at the cost of “innocent taxpaying
American families.” See 156 CONG. REC. 7222 (2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (“Wall
Street gamblers . . . are happy to enjoy the upside but want to socialize the downside.”); id. at
7231, 7308, 7310 (recording the passage of Senate Amendment 3827, which contained provisions
striking the target value of the fund and the initial capitalization from risk-based assessments on
large financial institutions). For a discussion of the moral-hazard debate over government deposit
insurance of banks, see generally Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, FDIC, Deposit Insurance:
Addressing Its Moral Hazard Effect (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/
spoct1117.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4M4-FYSL].
287. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 815, 831. CDS protection buyers could further protect themselves by requiring their
protection sellers to put up collateral, which is marked to market. Shadab, supra note 191, at 436.
This type of requirement, however, could be very expensive.
288. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES CATASTROPHE MGMT. WORK GRP., CATASTROPHE
EXPOSURE AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 7–15 (2001),
https://www.actuary.org/sites/default/files/pdf/casualty/catastrophe_061001.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QA5T-ETTL].
289. Id.
290. For an overview of reinsurance and its costs and benefits, see Daniel Schwarcz & Steven
L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1613–18 (2014).
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inevitable CDS-market failures. These recommendations should
complement the G20 regulatory scheme.
CONCLUSION
The perception that derivatives are exotic and uniquely risky
financial instruments has given rise to a regulatory patchwork
described as confusing, incomplete, and contradictory. This Article
rethinks how derivatives should be regulated.291 In contrast to much
existing scholarship, which analyzes derivatives under somewhat
arcane industry-derived categories, the Article deconstructs
derivatives by their economic functions into two categories of
traditional legal instruments—option contracts and guarantees. Like
these instruments, most derivatives are neither exotic nor uniquely
risky.
The Article explains why the potential for derivatives to create
very significant risk is primarily limited to CDS contracts, the category
of derivatives that function as financial guarantees. The Article also
explains why financial guarantee risk, and thus CDS risk, is magnified
when the contract has one or more systemically important
counterparties, which is typical of CDS contracts. Moreover, the
absence of an insurable-interest requirement under some CDS
contracts can even further magnify that risk.292
The Article then analyzes how CDS contracts that have one or
more systemically important counterparties should be regulated and
how the absence of an insurable interest should affect that regulation.
Recognizing that even the best regulation cannot eliminate CDS risk,
the Article also examines how to regulate the failures that inevitably
will occur.

291. This Article analyzes how to regulate, not who should regulate, derivatives. For example,
it does not analyze which regulatory bodies should set protection seller limits and protection
buyer limits. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text. Others have examined, and continue
to analyze, who should regulate derivatives. Compare BARR ET AL., supra note 120, at 1168–71,
1177–79 (discussing the jurisdictional “fight over OTC derivatives regulation” in the United
States), and id. at 1179–80 (discussing the coordination of an international regulatory response),
with Hazen, supra note 145, at 135 (“The overlapping nature of the sophisticated financial markets
makes it difficult to identify the most natural regulator. It follows that instead, we should look for
the most suitable regulator in terms of expertise and understanding of the complex financial and
derivatives markets.”).
292. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (describing the insurable-interest
requirement and how it helps reduce moral hazard).
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Finally, the Appendix proposes the text of a model law to
implement the Article’s regulatory recommendations. The model law
is intended to complement and enhance the existing G20 regulatory
scheme for derivatives, which is followed by the United States and
many other countries.293 This follows the well-respected approach of
building normative legal improvements onto an established positive
law foundation.
Calls for derivatives regulation are understandable;
underregulation doubtless contributed to the 2007–2008 financial
crisis, and regulatory solutions could doubtless help prevent future
crises. But regulators must understand and differentiate the types of
derivatives and their potential risk in order to craft meaningful
solutions. Such solutions should address derivatives risk that threatens
economic stability, without impairing the risk-shifting benefits of the
derivatives market as a whole.

293. The G20’s principal regulatory goal, for example, is to require central clearing of most
derivatives contracts; this is intended to reduce counterparty, and thus systemic, risk by ensuring
the performance of a derivatives contract even if a counterparty fails. See supra notes 125–37 and
accompanying text. This Article’s three regulatory approaches would supplement, and thereby
augment, central clearing by specifically targeting the riskiest derivatives—systemically risky CDS
contracts. Except as observed, this Article does not independently assess the merits of central
clearing. The Article has noted, however, that central clearing inadvertently could increase
systemic risk by concentrating counterparty risk. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. If
central clearing actually reduces systemic risk, it should be appropriate not only, as the G20
suggests, for derivatives but also for all large financial contracts with systemically important
counterparties. See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX: MODEL REGULATORY LANGUAGE
IMPLEMENTING THIS ARTICLE’S RECOMMENDATIONS294
Preamble
This Law applies to credit-default swap (“CDS”) contracts that
have one or more systemically important counterparties. These
contracts can cause significant public harm if a systemically important
protection seller’s default leads to its failure or if protection-seller
defaults cause a systemically important protection buyer’s failure. To
control that harm, this Law limits the credit exposure of systemically
important counterparties on CDS contracts and establishes procedures
to help correct the cognitive biases that motivate excessive risk-taking
by those counterparties.
Chapter I: Scope, Interpretation, and Definitions
Article 1: Scope and Interpretation
(1) This Law applies to all CDS contracts, whether or not they
guarantee insurable interests. It shall supplement, and not restrict,
the application of other laws and regulations that apply to CDS
contracts.
(2) The CDS Regulator may issue such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to administer and interpret this Law.
(3) This Law shall be liberally construed to promote its remedial
purposes described in the Preamble.
Article 2: Definitions
In this Law, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(1) “CDS” and “CDS contract” each means a credit-default swap,
which includes any contractual or other arrangement in which a
protection seller agrees, in exchange for the payment of a fee or
other consideration by or on behalf of a protection buyer, to
assume or otherwise guarantee credit risk with respect to debt
obligations.

294. [The bracketed footnotes to this Law are solely informational.]
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(2) “CDS Regulator” means [name(s) of government agency or other
body with primary regulatory authority under this Law295].
(3) “CDS Risk Officer” shall have the meaning set forth in Ch. IV,
Art. 1(1) of this Law.
(4) “Cognitive bias” means an implicit simplification of a person’s
perception of reality, and includes optimism bias (in this context,
the tendency of protection sellers to believe they can quantify
unquantifiable risks) and abstraction bias (in this context, the
tendency of protection sellers to underestimate risk because they
do not actually transfer funds at the time they enter into a CDS
contract).
(5) “Common enterprise” means the relationship existing between
two or more protection sellers when—
(a) such protection sellers are related directly or indirectly
through common control; or
(b) the CDS Regulator determines, based upon an evaluation of
facts and circumstances (including substantial financial
interdependence or an “affiliate” relationship under
applicable accounting standards296), that a common enterprise
exists between such protection sellers.297
(6) “Correlated” means that an event triggering a protection seller’s
payment obligations under a CDS contract is or may be related to
one or more events triggering that protection seller’s payment
obligations under other CDS contracts, as determined by the CDS
Regulator.
(7) “Counterparty” means a party to a CDS contract, whether as
protection seller or protection buyer.

295. [In the United States, this could be the CFTC and SEC. See Derivatives, SEC (May 4,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml [https://perma.cc/M7GU-VTUB]
(describing distribution of swap agreement oversight between the CFTC and SEC). It might also
include appropriate Federal banking agencies, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the FDIC, or Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.]
296. [Cf. 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 (2020) (discussing the inclusion of affiliates as counterparties for
single-counterparty credit-limit purposes).]
297. [Cf. id. § 32.5(c) (defining “common enterprise” for the purpose of bank lending limits).]
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(8) “Insurable interest” means an interest of the protection buyer to
receive payments under debt obligations guaranteed by a CDS
contract.
(9) “Notional amount” means the principal and accrued interest on
debt obligations guaranteed by CDS contracts.298
(10) “Protection buyer” means the party to a CDS contract for which
the protection seller agrees to assume or otherwise guarantee
credit risk with respect to debt obligations.
(11) “Protection buyer limit” means the lowest aggregate amount of
CDS protection that, if unpaid when due, would impair the ability
of a protection buyer to continue operating.
(12) “Protection seller” means the party to a CDS contract that agrees
to assume or otherwise guarantee credit risk with respect to debt
obligations.
(13) “Protection seller limit” means the lowest aggregate amount of
CDS protection that, if required to be paid simultaneously, would
impair the ability of a protection seller to continue operating.
(14) “Stress testing program” means the CDS-specific stress testing
program implemented by Ch. IV, Art. 2 of this Law.
(15) “Systemically important” means any firm or other entity
identified as systemically important by [name of relevant
government agency or other body299].
(16) “Violation” shall include noncompliance.
Chapter II: Protection Seller Limit
Article 1: Scope
(1) This Chapter applies to any systemically important protection
seller.

298. [See supra notes 96, 178 (observing that because CDS contracts guarantee debt
obligations, their notional amount is the principal and accrued interest outstanding on those
obligations).]
299. [In the United States, this would be the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).
See Designations, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialmarkets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/fsoc/designations [https://perma.cc/44NW-CTA6].]
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(2) The protection seller limit in this Chapter applies independently
of any applicable lending limit.300
Article 2: Limit on CDS Exposure as Protection Seller
(1) A systemically important protection seller shall not permit the
notional amount of any correlated exposure outstanding under
CDS contracts to exceed its protection seller limit.
(2) If for reasons beyond its control, the notional amount of a
protection seller’s correlated exposure outstanding exceeds its
protection seller limit under clause (1), such protection seller shall
use its best efforts to reduce that exposure into conformity with its
protection seller limit within 90 calendar days.
Article 3: Determination of Protection Seller Limit
(1) The protection seller limit shall be determined by the CDS
Regulator, in consultation with the protection seller, as of the last
business day of each preceding calendar year or, if so requested
by the CDS Regulator, more frequently.
(2) Such determination shall take into account all relevant facts and
circumstances, including the results of the stress testing program.
Chapter III: Protection Buyer Limit
Article 1: Scope
(1) This Chapter applies to any systemically important protection
buyer.
(2) The protection buyer limit in this Chapter applies independently
of any applicable lending limit.301

300. [In the United States, these lending limits are imposed under 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2018), which
limits a bank’s extensions of credit to any one person to 15 percent of the bank’s capital and
surplus (with additional 10 percent lending availability for loans fully secured by readily
marketable collateral). Section 84 lending limits include derivatives exposure. Id. § 84(b); 12
C.F.R. pt. 32. The Dodd-Frank Act and subsequent regulation imposed single-counterparty credit
limits for the largest bank holding companies and foreign banking organizations. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376–
2223, 1427 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(e)); 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).]
301. [These lending limits in the United States are discussed supra note 300.]
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Article 2: Limit on CDS Exposure as Protection Buyer
(1) A systemically important protection buyer shall not permit the
total outstanding notional amount of CDS protection bought
from any protection seller or from protection sellers representing
a common enterprise to exceed its protection buyer limit.
(2) If for reasons beyond its control (including an unforeseeable
merger or acquisition of protection sellers that creates, or
increases the CDS exposure of, a common enterprise), the total
outstanding notional amount of a protection buyer’s CDS
protection exceeds its protection buyer limit under clause (1),
such protection buyer shall use its best efforts to reduce that total
protection into conformity with its protection buyer limit within
90 calendar days.
Article 3: Determination of Protection Buyer Limit
(1) The protection buyer limit shall be determined by the CDS
Regulator, in consultation with the protection buyer, as of the last
business day of each preceding calendar year or, if so requested
by the CDS Regulator, more frequently.
(2) Such determination shall take into account all relevant facts and
circumstances, including consideration of any collateral securing
the obligations of protection sellers to pay the protection buyer.
Chapter IV: Debiasing and Stress Testing
Article 1: CDS Risk Officer and Education Program
(1) Each systemically important protection seller shall designate a
senior compliance officer as its CDS Risk Officer.
(2) The CDS Risk Officer shall be responsible for designing and
implementing an education program of mandatory quarterly
lectures and readings on the risks and cognitive biases attendant
to CDS transactions, and shall provide the syllabus of such
education program annually to the CDS Regulator. Such
education program shall include, without limitation, narrative
information on the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, American
International Group’s near-failure due to CDS exposure, the
impact of these events on the careers of managers involved with
CDS contracts, and the limits of financial modeling.
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(3) The CDS Risk Officer shall certify annually to the CDS Regulator
that all of the protection seller’s credit officers, traders, and other
similar employees and contractors who are responsible for
transactions involving CDS contracts have successfully satisfied
the requirements of that education program.
(4) The CDS Risk Officer shall be responsible for approving all CDS
protection sold by the protection seller. Such approval process
shall take into account reasonably worst-case scenarios and
potential risks.
Article 2: Stress Testing Program
(1) Each systemically important protection seller shall annually
conduct a stress testing program for its CDS contracts.302
(2) For each correlated exposure, the stress testing program shall
assume that the protection seller must simultaneously pay all of its
CDS obligations triggered by that exposure.
(3) For each correlated exposure, the stress testing program also shall
assume that the protection seller must simultaneously post all
collateral required to meet margin requirements triggered by that
exposure.
(4) The stress testing program will model any remaining CDS
exposure under economic conditions at least as difficult as those
that occurred during the Great Depression and the global
financial crisis.
(5) The CDS Risk Officer shall distribute the results of the stress
testing program to all of the protection seller’s credit officers,
traders, and other similar employees and contractors who are
responsible for transactions involving CDS contracts. In such
distribution, the CDS Risk Officer shall highlight the potential for
CDS and other financial guarantee transactions to result in actual
property transfers, including the posting of collateral.

302. [Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (requiring annual stress tests for nonbank financial companies
supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and banks with $250 billion
or more in assets); 12 C.F.R. § 252.45 (allowing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to require additional submissions for stress tests); BASEL COMM., A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, supra note 219, at 46–47 (describing stress test requirements).]
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(6) The CDS Risk Officer also shall certify the results of the stress
testing program in a report submitted annually to the CDS
Regulator,303 which shall publish that report on its website.
Chapter V: Penalties for Violation
Article 1: Violation by Protection Seller
(1) If a protection seller violates any provision of this Law, it shall
pay to the CDS Regulator a penalty, for each day such violation
remains uncured, equal to [_]% of the notional amount of its
then-outstanding total exposure under CDS contracts.304
(2) If a protection seller continues to violate a provision of this Law
for more than 120 days, the CDS Regulator may suspend that
protection seller’s right to sell protection until the violation is
cured and also may require that protection seller to disclose risks,
economic information, and incentives for each CDS transaction to
all relevant counterparties.305
(3) The failure of a protection seller to reduce its correlated exposure
into conformity with the protection seller limit within 90 calendar
days, as required by Ch. II, Art. 2(2), shall not constitute a
violation of this Law so long as such protection seller is continuing
to use its best efforts to bring its correlated exposure into such
conformity.
Article 2: Violation by Protection Buyer
(1) If a protection buyer violates any provision of this Law, it shall
pay to the CDS Regulator a penalty, for each day such violation
remains uncured, equal to [_]% of the notional amount of its
then-outstanding total CDS protection bought.306
(2) If a protection buyer continues to violate a provision of this Law
for more than 120 days, the CDS Regulator may suspend that
303. [Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(k)(3) (2018) (requiring the chief compliance officer of a swap dealer
or major swap participant to submit an annual report on compliance procedures to the CFTC).]
304. [The relevant percentage should be material enough to constitute a meaningful penalty
but still small enough not to jeopardize the protection seller’s financial condition.]
305. [Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 23.431 (2020) (requiring disclosure of a swap’s risks and contractual
qualities, as well as the swap dealer’s incentives, when a swap dealer trades uncleared swaps with
a counterparty other than another registered swap dealer or major swap participant).]
306. [The relevant percentage should be material enough to constitute a meaningful penalty
but still small enough not to jeopardize the protection buyer’s financial condition.]
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protection buyer’s right to buy protection until the violation is
cured.
(3) The failure of a protection buyer to bring its total protection into
conformity with the protection buyer limit within 90 calendar
days, as required by Ch. III, Art. 2(2), shall not constitute a
violation of this Law so long as such protection buyer is
continuing to use its best efforts to bring its total protection into
such conformity.
Article 3: Violation by CDS Risk Officer
(1) If the CDS Regulator determines that a CDS Risk Officer is
violating any provision of this Law, it may require the relevant
protection seller to designate a different CDS Risk Officer.
(2) The CDS Regulator may impose a civil penalty of [$ ] per day per
violation on any CDS Risk Officer that the CDS Regulator
determines is violating any provision of this Law.307
(3) The failure of a protection seller to monitor and require its CDS
Risk Officer to comply with this Law shall itself constitute a
violation by such protection seller for purposes of Art. 1 of this
Chapter.

307. [The relevant amount should be material enough to constitute a meaningful penalty but
still small enough not to deter capable managers from wishing to serve as CDS Risk Officers.]

